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RELUCTANCE OR APATHY? EXAMINING 
GEORGIA’S CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO A 
STRICT MUTUALITY ISSUE PRECLUSION 
DOCTRINE 
Boris W. Gautier* 
ABSTRACT 
The common law doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as 
collateral estoppel, prevents parties from relitigating an issue in 
subsequent lawsuits if a prior judgment already conclusively decided 
the issue. Issue preclusion traditionally required strict mutuality of 
parties; the first and second lawsuits had to involve the exact same 
litigants. Although the majority of jurisdictions now allow nonmutual 
issue preclusion, Georgia continues to enforce “identity of parties” 
as a necessary element of issue preclusion. Despite recently 
reaffirming this requirement, the Georgia Supreme Court has not 
thoroughly analyzed the merits of the rule. 
This Note examines the evolution of issue preclusion and the 
mutuality element in federal and state courts, distinguishes offensive 
and defensive assertions of issue preclusion, contrasts Georgia with 
other jurisdictions, considers policy arguments, and explores why the 
Georgia Supreme Court has not addressed the nationwide trend 
towards allowing nonmutual issue preclusion. The Note argues for 
changing Georgia law to allow nonmutual issue preclusion in civil 
litigation and advises practitioners on practical avenues for 
achieving that goal. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers and politicians often argue that someone who had a 
chance to formally prove or disprove something should not receive 
“another bite at the apple.”1 The common law principle of issue 
preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel,2 turns that maxim into 
a procedural rule.3 Issue preclusion in civil cases “bars parties from 
relitigating issues of either fact or law that were adjudicated in an 
earlier proceeding.”4 Practically, this doctrine means that if a court 
decided an issue in one lawsuit, then parties in a second lawsuit do 
not need to relitigate the same issue.5 Issue preclusion, unlike claim 
preclusion, is not necessarily case-dispositive but rather narrows the 
scope of the second suit by removing an issue from consideration.6 
 
 1. Second Bite of the Apple, THE FREE DICTIONARY, 
https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/second+bite+of+the+apple [https://perma.cc/A98Y-7YJS] 
(defining “second bite of the apple” as “a second chance or opportunity”). See generally Mark 
DeBofsky, Court Gives Insurer Another Bite at the Apple, DEBOFSKY (July 6, 2013), 
https://www.debofsky.com/articles/court-gives-insurer-another-bite-at-the-apple/ 
[https://perma.cc/59EG-CHW9]. At least one Georgia court also noted the policy disfavoring repeated 
chances when it held against allowing a statute of limitations exception because a party “chose not to 
present any evidence . . . and it is not entitled to another bite at the apple.” Desalvo v. State, 683 S.E.2d 
652, 653 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted). 
 2. For the purposes of this Note, the author will generally use the more modern term “issue 
preclusion,” except when quoting directly from case law. Notably, however, courts may also use the 
term “res judicata” to refer to both issue preclusion and claim preclusion. See, e.g., Lucky Brand 
Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., No. 18-1086, slip op. at 6 (U.S. May 14, 2020). The U.S. 
Supreme Court explained the various terminologies by first clarifying that res judicata “now comprises 
two distinct doctrines regarding the preclusive effect of prior litigation.” Id. These two doctrines are 
“issue preclusion (sometimes called collateral estoppel)” and “claim preclusion (sometimes itself called 
res judicata).” Id. 
 3. See generally 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4416 (3d ed. 2020). 
 4. Robb Evans & Assocs., LLC v. United States, 850 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2017); see also Lucky 
Brand Dungarees, slip op. at 6 (“[I]ssue preclusion (sometimes called collateral estoppel), . . . precludes 
a party from relitigating an issue actually decided in a prior case and necessary to the judgment.”). 
Application of issue preclusion in criminal cases falls beyond the scope of this Note. 
 5. RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 571 (3d ed. 2012). 
 6. Id. One scholar provides a useful example of how issue preclusion works and how it is not 
case-dispositive: 
[S]uppose in the car accident involving Petra and Don that Petra had a passenger 
Paul. If Petra sues Don, and Don is found at fault in causing the accident in Petra’s 
lawsuit, then collateral estoppel will prevent Don from relitigating the issue of fault 
when Paul sues him, even though Paul’s legal claim is different from Petra’s. Paul 
will, of course, still have to prove causation for his own injuries as well as damages. 
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Procedurally, a litigant may raise issue preclusion in a motion for 
summary judgment, another pleading, or in some circumstances, in a 
motion to dismiss.7 
Traditionally, issue preclusion only applied if the first lawsuit and 
the second lawsuit both involved the same parties (or their privies) as 
direct adversaries to prevent parties from relitigating the same issue 
against one another over and over again.8 However, federal courts 
and the majority of states have disavowed this strict mutuality 
standard and now allow a new litigant—a stranger to the prior 
action—to assert issue preclusion in the second lawsuit against an 
adversary that was a party to the first lawsuit.9 Under this modern 
 
Michael H. Hoffheimer, Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel in Mississippi, 88 MISS. L.J. 521, 529 (2020). 
 7. 18 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 132.05 (3d ed. 2020). Issue 
preclusion is typically treated as an affirmative defense for purposes of burden of proof—the party 
raising issue preclusion must prove it, typically, by introducing the record of prior judgment. Id. 
Regardless of the procedural vehicle, the movant should raise issue preclusion before trial. Id. Like other 
affirmative defenses, a party may inadvertently waive the right to assert issue preclusion if the party 
does not raise it at the trial court level. Id. 
 8. Id. § 51:261 (issue preclusion may be asserted “if the party asserting issue preclusion was a party 
or in privity with a party to the prior action, such that it would have been bound had the earlier litigation 
reached the opposite result”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. L. INST. 
1982) (stating that issue preclusion applies “where the second action is between the same persons who 
were parties to the prior action, and who were adversaries”). Privity refers to when two persons or 
entities are closely aligned with regard to the relevant matters such that a judgment against one binds the 
other. FREER, supra note 3, at 608. Privies are essentially regarded as the same party for the purposes of 
the litigation; allowing privies to an original litigant to assert issue preclusion does not violate strict 
mutuality. Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 950 (1988) 
(“With a mutuality requirement, issue preclusion applies only between parties, or those in privity with 
parties, to the initial lawsuit.” (emphasis added)). A privity analysis implicates constitutional due 
process concerns of whether preclusion may be asserted against someone who was not technically a 
party to the first lawsuit. FREER, supra note 5, at 606–17. In contrast, a mutuality analysis involves 
asking “[b]y (not against) whom can [issue] preclusion be asserted,” and that question does not raise due 
process issues. Id. at 617. The U.S. Supreme Court in Taylor v. Sturgell laid out the requirements for 
privity, also known as “nonparty preclusion” in this context, and listed six categories of privies. See 553 
U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008). Georgia law is less clear on the privity issue and may analyze it on a 
case-by-case basis. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549, 552 (Ga. 2006) 
(‘“[T]here is no definition of “privity” which can be automatically applied to all cases involving the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel,’ . . . since ‘privity depends upon the 
circumstances.’ . . . ‘Privity may . . . be established if the party to the first suit represented the interests 
of the party to the second suit.’” (quoting Satsky v. Paramount Commc’ns, 7 F.3d 1464, 1468–69 (10th 
Cir. 1993))); see also ALR Oglethorpe, LLC v. Henderson, 783 S.E.2d 187, 192 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016); 
Dalton Paving & Constr., Inc. v. S. Green Constr. of Ga., Inc., 643 S.E.2d 754, 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); 
Bennett v. Cotton, 536 S.E.2d 802, 804 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Olson v. Harveston, 276 S.E.2d 54, 65 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1981). 
 9. FREER, supra note 5, at 618–31. 
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trend, a new defendant can use issue preclusion against a party to the 
first lawsuit (nonmutual defensive issue preclusion), and in some 
jurisdictions, a new plaintiff can also use issue preclusion against a 
party to the first lawsuit (nonmutual offensive issue preclusion).10 In 
all cases, parties can only use issue preclusion against someone who 
was a party to the first lawsuit because of due process concerns.11 
Thus, the key question in application of mutuality doctrines is “[b]y 
(not against) whom can [issue] preclusion be asserted?”12 A court’s 
analysis will depend on whether a defendant or a plaintiff asserts 
issue preclusion.13 
Although most states have followed the modern trend towards 
abandoning strict mutuality and at least allowing nonmutual 
defensive issue preclusion, the Georgia Supreme Court has not 
addressed the issue.14 Despite a clear plea following a thorough 
analysis by the Georgia Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme 
Court declined to consider whether Georgia should join the vast 
majority of states and allow nonmutual defensive issue preclusion.15 
In Georgia, “collateral estoppel requires the identity of the parties or 
their privies in both actions.”16 In other words, Georgia is part of a 
 
 10. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. 
v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 320–23 (1971); Douris v. Schweiker, 229 F. Supp. 2d 391, 399 
(E.D. Pa. 2002). 
 11. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464 (“[C]ourts have adopted a rule that nonmutual issue 
preclusion is permitted unless it would be unfair. This fairness limitation does not apply to nonparties 
who would have been bound by the prior judgment . . . .”); see also, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 
90, 95 (1980) (“But one general limitation the Court has repeatedly recognized is that the concept of 
collateral estoppel cannot apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not 
have a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate that issue in the earlier case.” (quoting Montana v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979))). 
 12. FREER, supra note 5, at 617 (emphasis omitted). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See infra Section II.C. 
 15. See generally Wickliffe v. Wickliffe Co. (Wickliffe I), 489 S.E.2d 153 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997), cert. 
denied, No. S97C1859, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 185 (Ga. Jan. 5, 1998). 
 16. Waldroup v. Greene Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 463 S.E.2d 5, 5–8 (Ga. 1995); see also Sure, Inc. v. 
Premier Petroleum, Inc., 807 S.E.2d 19, 25 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (“The doctrine of collateral estoppel, 
also known as issue preclusion, prevents the re-litigation of an issue actually litigated and adjudicated on 
the merits between the same parties or their privies.” (quoting York v. RES-GA LJY, LLC, 799 S.E.2d 
235, 241 (Ga. 2017))). Georgia courts tend to use the term “collateral estoppel” rather than “issue 
preclusion.” See, e.g., Waldroup, 463 S.E.2d at 6; Body of Christ Overcoming Church of God, Inc. v. 
Brinson, 696 S.E.2d 667, 668–69 (Ga. 2010). Georgia courts also often confuse and intertwine the use 
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slimming minority of jurisdictions that still require strict mutuality of 
parties or their privies for issue preclusion to bar or merge an issue in 
a second lawsuit.17 
Determining the proper scope of mutuality is not merely an 
academic exercise.18 Preclusion law also implicates economic 
concerns for both individuals and industry.19 For instance, if multiple 
corporate defendants must each separately litigate the same issue of 
liability for the same plaintiff’s alleged injury, then they will need to 
expend resources to cover these duplicative litigation costs.20 In 
contrast, under a nonmutual defensive preclusion regime, if a jury 
finds the plaintiff caused her own injuries, then each subsequent 
defendant can rely on that judgment and preclude the causation issue 
from relitigation at the second trial—potentially saving the 
company-defendant thousands of dollars in expenses such as the 
costs of experts, depositions, and attorney’s fees.21 Given Georgia’s 
 
of the terms “collateral estoppel” and “res judicata” and the distinct elements of each doctrine. See, e.g., 
Waggaman v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 458 S.E.2d 826, 827 (Ga. 1995) (applying an issue preclusion 
analysis but referring to it as “res judicata” throughout the opinion); see also, e.g., ALR Oglethorpe, 
LLC v. Henderson, 783 S.E.2d 187, 191 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (“The law of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel is somewhat confusing, primarily due to our failure to clearly and consistently distinguish the 
two separate doctrines.”). The U.S. Supreme Court defined the term res judicata as encompassing both 
claim and issue preclusion. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (“The preclusive effect of a 
judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which are collectively referred to as ‘res 
judicata.’”). However, most hornbooks, black letter law treatises, and law school civil procedure 
casebooks separate the concepts and list res judicata as synonymous with claim preclusion and collateral 
estoppel as synonymous with issue preclusion. See, e.g., A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 1017–56 (5th ed. 2018). 
 17. See E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Mutuality of Estoppel As Prerequisite of Availability of Doctrine 
of Collateral Estoppel to a Stranger to the Judgment, 31 A.L.R.3d 1044, § 3(a) (1970). 
 18. See generally Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992); Peter H. Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly Frivolous 
Litigation Games, 23 REV. LITIG. 47 (2004); Daniel Klerman, The Economics of Civil Procedure, 11 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 353 (2015). 
 19. See generally Bone, supra note 18; Huang, supra note 18; Klerman, supra note 18. 
 20. Costs in Civil Lawsuits, LAWYERS.COM, https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/research/court-
costs-in-civil-lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/F9GF-CV7C] (Apr. 9, 2015). Unlike other countries, 
courts in the United States generally follow the aptly named “American Rule.” John F. Vargo, The 
American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 
1567, 1569 (1993). Under this rule, each litigant must pay his own legal fees regardless of the outcome 
of litigation. Id. In contrast, the “English Rule” allows a successful plaintiff to shift the cost of his 
attorney’s fees to the losing defendant. Id. 
 21. MOORE ET AL., supra note 7, § 132.01 ¶ 3 (recognizing that issue preclusion “relieves parties of 
the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, prevents inconsistent decisions, encourages reliance on 
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growing economy and current policy directives favoring business 
development, the economic reasons for abandoning mutuality are 
especially relevant to the state.22 By furthering the policies of 
predictability, finality, repose, and efficiency, nonmutual defensive 
issue preclusion promotes economic growth while still protecting due 
process and an injured plaintiff’s first “bite of the apple.”23 
This Note examines the implications of Georgia’s continuing use 
of this strict mutuality standard in civil suits. Part I of the Note 
provides background into the history of common law issue preclusion 
and the trend towards nonmutual defensive and nonmutual offensive 
applications in federal courts and other states, as well as the current 
status of Georgia law. Part II provides a discussion of policy reasons 
in favor of and in opposition to changing the mutuality standard, 
further analysis of Georgia law compared with other jurisdictions, 
and an examination of prior attempts by practitioners to raise the 
matter to the Georgia Supreme Court. Part III discusses why Georgia 
should adopt a nonmutual defensive issue preclusion standard and the 
best practical avenues to achieve that goal. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In addition to some form of mutuality or limited nonmutuality, the 
black letter law elements of issue preclusion include: (1) both actions 
involved an identical issue; (2) the issue was actually litigated and 
decided in the first action; (3) the parties in the first action had a full 
 
adjudication by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions, and conserves judicial resources”); 
see also Costs in Civil Lawsuits, supra note 20 (noting that litigation expenses can include filing fees 
and witness fees). 
 22. Pro-Business Environment, GA. DEP’T OF ECON. DEV., https://www.georgia.org/competitive-
advantages/pro-business-environment [https://perma.cc/PAU4-G3DA]. Georgia has been named the 
number one state for business by multiple publications. Id. Georgia’s current policy incentives to attract 
new businesses include low taxes, tax credits, and investment in infrastructure. Id. Georgia aims to 
attract Fortune 500 companies to the state through “favorable business conditions.” Id. 
 23. Bone, supra note 18, at 229 (listing “judicial economy, repose, and decisional consistency” as 
policy reasons for issue preclusion); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, Offensive Non-Mutual Issue 
Preclusion Revisited, 38 REV. LITIG. 281, 287–88 (2019) (defending nonmutual defensive issue 
preclusion because “a litigant is entitled to one bite—and only one bite—of the apple”). 
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and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the first action was 
adjudicated as a valid final judgment on the merits.24 Because of due 
process concerns, issue preclusion can only ever be asserted against a 
party to the first action; the Constitution affords each party its day in 
court.25 Thus, if a party did not have an opportunity to litigate the 
issue, preclusion doctrines do not apply.26 Mutuality—the final 
element of issue preclusion and the subject of this Note—involves 
which parties may assert issue preclusion.27 
The mutuality element of issue preclusion has three general 
variations: strict mutuality, nonmutual defensive, and nonmutual 
offensive.28 Historically, courts applied the strict mutuality standard 
(sometimes itself called “mutuality”), which requires that issue 
preclusion only be asserted by a litigant who was a party to the first 
case.29 Nonmutual preclusion refers to scenarios where the party 
asserting issue preclusion in the second case was not a party to the 
 
 24. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3. In contrast, “claim preclusion prevents parties from raising 
issues that could have been raised and decided in a prior action—even if they were not actually 
litigated.” Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., No. 18-1086, slip op. at 6 (U.S. 
May 14, 2020). 
 25. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (recognizing that issue preclusion rules should 
comply with the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court” 
(quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4449)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Despite this 
apparent constitutional protection, some commentators suggest that courts should expand issue 
preclusion and allow litigants to assert it even against some nonparties in cases when “the nonparty sues 
about the same set of events, asserts the same legal theories, seeks the same remedies, or shares the 
same interests in the outcome of the litigation as the plaintiff to the first suit” or when “the nonparty and 
the original plaintiff retain the same attorney or . . . the nonparty testified at the original trial.” Bone, 
supra note 18, at 196. 
 26. See generally Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008). The Taylor court also recognized 
exceptions to this rule—circumstances where issue preclusion could be used against someone who was 
not a party to the first lawsuit. Id. “In a class action, for example, a person not named as a party may be 
bound by a judgment on the merits of the action, if she was adequately represented by a party who 
actively participated in the litigation.” Id. at 884. The major exception, in federal courts and state courts, 
is when a nonparty was in privity with a party to the first suit. See infra Section II.B, for further 
discussion of this privity exception and how it is distinct from the mutuality requirement. 
 27. Cavanagh, supra note 23, at 296–97. 
 28. See Erichson, supra note 8, at 965–68. 
 29. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464 (“The traditional mutuality rule denied the benefits of 
preclusion to any nonparty who would not have been subject to the burdens of preclusion, but with 
gradually expanding exceptions for vicarious liability relationships. This traditional rule has been 
abandoned as to issue preclusion by federal courts and a continually increasing majority of state 
courts.”); see also, e.g., Fisher v. Jones, 844 S.W.2d 954, 958 (Ark. 1993) (“[T]he requirement of 
mutuality has been abandoned by most jurisdictions for collateral estoppel.”). 
8
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first case.30 Nonmutual defensive means that the defendant in the 
second case asserts issue preclusion.31 In contrast, nonmutual 
offensive refers to the second-case plaintiff asserting issue 
preclusion.32 Although virtually all American courts permit strictly 
mutual assertions of issue preclusion, whether a nonmutual litigant 
may assert issue preclusion varies by jurisdiction.33 
A. Federal Law 
The U.S. Supreme Court disavowed the strict mutuality standard in 
favor of allowing nonmutual defensive preclusion in the 1971 
seminal civil procedure case of Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. 
University of Illinois Foundation.34 The Court reaffirmed the 
abandonment of strict mutuality in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore 
and further extended the doctrine of issue preclusion to allow for 
nonmutual offensive issue preclusion in cases where its application 
meets certain fairness factors.35 Thus, under current federal 
jurisprudence, assuming the other elements are met, a new defendant, 
and in some cases a new plaintiff, to the second lawsuit may use 
issue preclusion to bar an issue from being relitigated against a party 
in the first lawsuit.36 
 
 30. See generally Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971); 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
 31. See generally Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. 313; Parklane, 439 U.S. 322. 
 32. See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464. 
 33. Id. 
 34. 402 U.S. 313. 
 35. 439 U.S. at 331–33. The fairness factors are: (1) whether the defendant had similar incentive to 
vigorously defend and litigate the first lawsuit, including whether the defendants could foresee 
subsequent lawsuits; (2) whether courts have resolved the issue differently, leading to inconsistent prior 
judgments; and (3) whether there are different or new procedures in the second suit that could cause a 
different result. Id. The Court concluded that the Parklane plaintiffs could use estoppel offensively 
because, in light of the seriousness of the allegations, the defendants had similar incentive to litigate the 
first action, no other courts had ruled inconsistently with the resolution of the issue in the first action, 
and defendants could not use any new procedures in the second action. Id. 
 36. See, e.g., id.; Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. 313. 
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1. The Evolution of Federal Law 
Before 1971, controlling federal court precedent generally required 
strict mutuality.37 However, lower courts increasingly found ways to 
distinguish precedent and allow nonmutual defensive preclusion.38 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit first affirmed 
defensive preclusion in 1950 when it held that a ship worker suing 
the United States for personal injuries under a negligence theory 
could not proceed to trial because the ship company and its crew 
were found not to be negligent for the same injuries in the worker’s 
prior lawsuit.39 Although the court arguably limited its holding to 
cases where respondeat superior would apply—the plaintiff was now 
asserting that the United States, not the ship company, was the 
principal—the majority opinion noted that “the countervailing 
consideration” was “lack of mutuality of estoppel.”40 The court noted 
 
 37. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 93 illus. 10 (AM. L. INST. 1942) (“A brings an 
action against B for infringement of a patent. B defends on the ground that the alleged patent was void 
and obtains judgment. A brings an action for infringement of the same patent against C who seeks to 
interpose the judgment in favor of B as res judicata, but set[s] up no relation with B. On demurrer, 
judgment should be for A.”); see also Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 642 (1936). See generally 
Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912) (recognizing “a 
principle of general elementary law that the estoppel of a judgment must be mutual”). 
 38. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 114 F.2d 582, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (“Our 
previous decisions are not technically res judicata as between appellant and appellee, since the latter was 
not a party to any of the prior proceedings. But those determinations are conclusive against appellant, 
unless we are now to repudiate what we have done repeatedly and consistently whenever the issues 
involved in them have been raised.”). Although the court in Fletcher used the oft-confused terminology 
of res judicata instead of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, the court used a disbarment ruling, to 
which the defendant newspaper was not a party, to bar relitigation of whether the plaintiff was actually 
disbarred for purposes of his libel claim. Id.; see also Smith v. Hood, 396 F.2d 692, 693 (D.C. Cir. 
1968). Although the court in Smith ultimately upheld the mutuality requirement as applied to the facts 
before it, it noted that “the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be in flux, with a trend towards barring 
relitigation of an issue by a one-time loser.” Id. Courts also recognized an exception to the mutuality 
rule when the first lawsuit was a class action and the litigant asserting issue preclusion in the second 
action was not a party to the class action but was a member of the class. Id. 
 39. See generally Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950). Although the court in 
Bruszewski used the term “res judicata” throughout the opinion, the opinion made clear that the primary 
dispute involved whether the issue of negligence had already been decided. Id. In this case, the issue of 
negligence was case-dispositive, so issue preclusion and claim preclusion would have led to the same 
result. Id. Furthermore, the court consistently referred to “mutuality of estoppel” as its primary 
consideration. Id. 
 40. Id. at 421 (“The countervailing consideration urged here is lack of mutuality of estoppel.”). The 
court could have reached the same conclusion under a privity analysis by finding that the United States 
and the ship company in the first lawsuit were in privity and there was mutuality, but the court 
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“the achievement of substantial justice rather than symmetry is the 
measure of the fairness” in preclusion cases, and that its holding 
supported “both orderliness and reasonable time saving in judicial 
administration.”41 
The Blonder-Tongue Court in 1971 seemed particularly persuaded 
by similar policy considerations in deciding whether a plaintiff could 
bring successive lawsuits for the same alleged wrong.42 The Court 
noted the increasingly crowded dockets and the need for judicial 
efficiency.43 Litigants should have incentives to assert and defend all 
of their claims at the first opportunity to avoid “the aura of the 
gaming table” that occurs when plaintiffs have numerous defendants 
against whom they could test different strategies and hope for more 
favorable outcomes.44 The Court also considered the external 
consequences of requiring strict mutuality and found changing the 
rule would make economic sense.45 A nonmutual defensive standard 
lowers overall litigation costs, presumably resulting in defendants 
 
commented that the two defendants may have been “beyond any definable categories of privity.” Id. The 
concurring opinion would have explicitly narrowed the holding to apply only when the defendants in the 
first case and the second case were “sufficiently close.” Id. at 423 (Goodrich, J., concurring). 
 41. Id. at 421. In a preview of the later U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the Bruszewski court 
emphasized that its decision did not result in any unfairness to the plaintiff. Id. The court dismissed 
arguments that allowing a lack of mutuality would make the law “asymmetrical.” Id. 
 42. Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971). 
 43. Id. The Court noted: 
[Other cases and authorities] connect erosion of the mutuality requirement to the goal 
of limiting relitigation of issues where that can be achieved without compromising 
fairness in particular cases. The courts have often discarded the rule while 
commenting on crowded dockets and long delays preceding trial. Authorities differ 
on whether the public interest in efficient judicial administration is a sufficient 
ground in and of itself for abandoning mutuality, but it is clear that more than 
crowded dockets is involved. . . . To the extent the defendant in the second suit may 
not win by asserting, without contradiction, that the plaintiff had fully and fairly, but 
unsuccessfully, litigated the same claim in the prior suit, the defendant’s time and 
money are diverted from alternative uses—productive or otherwise—to relitigation of 
a decided issue. 
Id. 
 44. Id. at 329 (“Permitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of unrelated 
defendants holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming table or [problems with the lower courts].”). 
 45. Id. at 346–47. Again, the Court’s analysis focused on the economic consequences of strict 
mutuality of patent cases. Id. However, the reasons the Court discussed in support of its conclusion—
namely, the potential added costs to litigants to defend the same issues multiple times—can be 
extrapolated to apply to all lawsuits. See infra Part II. 
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allocating resources to other investments or projects instead.46 The 
Court balanced those considerations with the traditionally understood 
arguments in favor of mutuality: fairness to litigants and due 
process.47 The Court ultimately overruled precedent and held that 
civil defendants may assert issue preclusion without the mutuality 
requirement—with the important caveat and “safeguard” that the 
party against whom issue preclusion is asserted “had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate.”48 
Because the underlying lawsuit in Blonder-Tongue involved 
patents, the Court primarily analyzed the policy considerations in the 
context of patent suits, but the same broad arguments apply to any 
assertion of nonmutual issue preclusion.49 In fact, although the 
expressed holding from Blonder-Tongue arguably only applied to 
patent infringement cases, federal courts generally applied the rule 
broadly and allowed nonmutual defensive issue preclusion in 
non-patent-related lawsuits as well.50 Lower courts cited 
Blonder-Tongue as a green light from the U.S. Supreme Court to 
abandon the mutuality doctrine altogether; its application was not 
limited to patent cases.51 Within the federal court system, the Third 
 
 46. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329 (“To the extent the defendant in the second suit may not win 
by asserting [issue preclusion], the defendant’s time and money are diverted from alternative uses—
productive or otherwise—to relitigation of a decided issue.”). 
 47. Id. at 328. 
 48. Id. at 329 (“[T]he requirement of determining whether the party against whom an estoppel is 
asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate is a most significant safeguard.”); id. at 349–50 
(“Thus, we conclude that [precedent] should be overruled to the extent it forecloses a plea of estoppel by 
one facing a charge of infringement of a patent that has once been declared invalid.”). 
 49. Id. at 328. 
 50. Id. at 349–50; see also, e.g., Cardillo v. Zyla, 486 F.2d 473, 475 (1st Cir. 1973) (“Mutuality of 
estoppel, once a requirement before there could be a preclusion of an issue by judgment, is no longer 
normally required.” (citing Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. 313)); Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 997 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (“Under traditional collateral estoppel theory, the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel required 
that the party asserting the defense must have been a party to the earlier litigation. In [Blonder-Tongue], 
the Supreme Court criticized and rejected the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel. Thus, [the defendants] 
may assert the defense.”). But see Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 771 (3d Cir. 1974) (“[I]t 
is at least questionable that the Blonder-Tongue case mandates a re-tailoring of estoppel law in 
non-patent cases . . . .”). The Court resolved this circuit split only a few years later in Parklane. See 
generally Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
 51. See, e.g., Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 844 (3d Cir. 1974) (allowing a 
nonmutual defensive issue preclusion defense in a contract and Sherman Act case). 
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Circuit continued leading this evolution of law and acknowledged the 
“virtual obliteration of the mutuality doctrine in [the] Circuit” only 
three years after Blonder-Tongue.52 The U.S. Supreme Court 
revisited the issue eight years later in Parklane and agreed with lower 
courts’ interpretation of Blonder-Tongue—that the decision “strongly 
suggested” abandonment of mutuality in all civil litigation, not only 
patent cases.53 
The Parklane Court confirmed that mutuality is no longer a 
requirement of issue preclusion in federal common law.54 The Court 
then discussed the different considerations between allowing 
defensive preclusion and allowing offensive preclusion.55 Under 
federal law, nonmutual defensive issue preclusion is now allowed as 
the default rule, whereas a plaintiff may only assert issue preclusion 
offensively in certain cases.56 The Court explained the limitation on a 
plaintiff’s assertion of nonmutual preclusion: “in cases where a 
plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where . . . the 
application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a 
trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral 
estoppel.”57 Offensive issue preclusion is unfair to the defendant and 
thus impermissible when, for example, the defendant had less 
incentive to defend itself in the first lawsuit, there are inconsistent 
prior decisions on the issue, or the second lawsuit allows the 
defendant more favorable procedures than the first lawsuit.58 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 327–28 (“[T]he Court in Blonder-Tongue . . . abandoned the mutuality 
requirement, at least in cases where a patentee seeks to relitigate the validity of a patent after a federal 
court in a previous lawsuit has already declared it invalid. The ‘broader question’ before the Court, 
however, was ‘whether it is any longer tenable to afford a litigant more than one full and fair 
opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue.’ The Court strongly suggested a negative answer to 
that question.” (quoting Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 328) (citation omitted)). In a later case, the Court 
limited nonmutual issue preclusion in litigation against the government. See United States v. Mendoza, 
464 U.S. 154, 157–61 (1984). 
 54. See generally Parklane, 439 U.S. 322. 
 55. Id. at 329–32. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 331. 
 58. Id. at 330–31. The Parklane Court explained: 
If a defendant in the first action is sued for small or nominal damages, he may have 
little incentive to defend vigorously, particularly if future suits are not foreseeable. 
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Not all Parklane Justices supported this further erosion of the 
mutuality requirement.59 In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist discussed 
the Seventh Amendment implications of allowing offensive issue 
preclusion.60 Rehnquist argued that if a plaintiff can preclude an issue 
using this procedural doctrine when the first case was a bench trial, 
then the defendant unconstitutionally loses his right to present that 
issue to a jury in the new lawsuit.61 Rehnquist also opined that, 
regardless of the constitutionality, depriving defendants of a jury trial 
is always unfair.62 Partially due to these concerns, many states have 
not permitted offensive use of issue preclusion at all.63 
 
Allowing offensive collateral estoppel may also be unfair to a defendant if the 
judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more 
previous judgments in favor of the defendant. Still another situation where it might be 
unfair to apply offensive estoppel is where the second action affords the defendant 
procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a 
different result. 
Id. (citations omitted). In more recent cases, the Court clarified that procedural opportunities are unfair 
to the defendant—and should therefore preclude a claimant’s offensive assertion of issue preclusion—
only when the procedures in the first case were unfair to the defendant; fair but simply “different” 
procedures in the first lawsuit would not necessarily weigh this factor unfavorably towards defendants. 
B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 158 (2015) (“Rather than focusing on whether 
procedural differences exist—they often will—the correct inquiry is whether the procedures used in the 
first proceeding were fundamentally poor, cursory, or unfair.”); see also Montana v. United States, 440 
U.S. 147, 163–64 (1979) (holding the defendant was precluded from relitigating issues previously 
decided in a state court because the defendant did not allege “unfairness or inadequacy in the state 
procedures”). Using that reasoning, the Court in B & B Hardware held that issue preclusion may still be 
asserted when an administrative board decided the issue without allowing live witness testimony. 135 
U.S. at 158 (“No one disputes that the TTAB and district courts use different procedures. Most notably, 
district courts feature live witnesses. Procedural differences, by themselves, however, do not defeat 
issue preclusion. Equity courts used different procedures than did law courts, but that did not bar issue 
preclusion.”). Similarly, the Parklane defendants were bound by the factual findings of a regulatory 
agency, which did not allow jury trials. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330–39. 
 59. See generally Parklane, 439 U.S. 322. 
 60. Id. at 337–56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 61. Id. The Seventh Amendment states, “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall 
be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 62. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 351 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“In my view, it is ‘unfair’ to apply 
offensive collateral estoppel where the party who is sought to be estopped has not had an opportunity to 
have the facts of his case determined by a jury.”). 
 63. FREER, supra note 5, at 628–29 (“[A]pparently most states have not embraced nonmutual 
offensive issue preclusion.”); see also, e.g., Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d 393, 399 
(Iowa 1998) (“Issue preclusion does not require mutuality of parties if it is being invoked defensively 
against a party so connected to the former action as to be bound by that resolution.”); Trinity Indus., Inc. 
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2. Choice of Law in Federal Courts 
The aforementioned decisions only apply to cases decided under 
federal preclusion law.64 When a litigant asserts issue preclusion, the 
court deciding the second case—either a state court or a federal 
court—must generally apply the preclusion law of the jurisdiction 
that decided the first case.65 When the first case was decided in a 
federal court under federal question jurisdiction, then federal 
preclusion law applies.66 When a federal court sitting in diversity 
 
v. McKinnon Bridge Co., 77 S.W.3d 159, 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (“In Tennessee the offensive use 
of collateral estoppel requires that the parties be identical in both actions. Without saying so specifically, 
however, Tennessee has not required party mutuality in applying defensive collateral estoppel.” 
(citations omitted)), abrogated by Bowen ex rel. Doe v. Arnold, 502 S.W.3d 102 (Tenn. 2016). 
 64. FREER, supra note 5, at 639–51; see also Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 
497, 508–09 (2001) (noting that each state can develop its own preclusion law). Federal preclusion 
law—as outlined in Blonder-Tongue and Parklane, among other cases—is binding authority in federal 
courts when both the first and second lawsuits were in federal court on federal question jurisdiction. 
FREER, supra note 5, at 651; see also Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946) (“It has been held in 
non-diversity cases, since Erie v. Tompkins, that the federal courts will apply their own rule of res 
judicata.” (citations omitted)); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 956 
(2d Cir. 1964) (“Since [both actions] present questions of federal law, we are free to follow our own 
conceptions as to the effect of the judgment in the former on the latter . . . .” (citations omitted)); Maher 
v. GSI Lumonics, Inc., 433 F.3d 123, 126 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[B]ecause the judgment in [the previous 
case] was rendered by a federal court exercising federal question jurisdiction, the applicability of res 
judicata is a matter of federal law.” (citation omitted)). Similarly, state courts should apply federal 
preclusion law when the first action was in federal court under federal question jurisdiction. FREER, 
supra note 5, at 648. However, not all state courts consistently apply this rule. Erichson, supra note 8, at 
1008 (“Of the 286 federal-state preclusion cases examined, the state court relied solely on its own state 
preclusion law in 169 cases (59%). The state court relied on federal preclusion law in [sixty-two] cases 
(22%). In an additional [thirty-six] cases (13%), the court appeared to rely on both its own and federal 
preclusion law.”). 
 65. FREER, supra note 5, at 639–51. Issue preclusion can apply across jurisdictions and judicial 
systems. See generally Erichson, supra note 8. When the first lawsuit and the second lawsuit are in state 
courts of different states, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution and the related federal 
statute support the rule that the court in the second suit must adhere to the preclusion law of the state 
that decided the first suit. U.S. CONST. art. IV; 28 U.S.C. § 1738; FREER, supra note 5, at 639–41. 
However, scholars disagree on the extent of the application of the other state’s preclusion law in certain 
circumstances, including regarding whether mutuality is a core component of a state’s preclusion law or 
rather a “minute detail” that should not apply in state-to-state preclusion. FREER, supra note 5, at 639–
41. When a state court decides the first lawsuit and a federal court hears the second suit, that federal 
court generally should apply the state preclusion law of the first-lawsuit state. Allen v. McCurry, 449 
U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (“Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to 
state court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do 
so . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 66. Allan D. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 
MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1739, 1745 (1968). 
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jurisdiction decided the first case, the court in the second case should 
follow the law of the state where that federal diversity court sits in 
accordance with choice of law doctrines.67 The significance of this 
distinction emerges when examining the differing mutuality 
requirements between the states.68 
B. Other States 
The majority of states have mirrored federal courts and abandoned 
strict mutuality as a necessary element of issue preclusion.69 In fact, 
some states began to question the mutuality dogma decades before 
the U.S. Supreme Court examined the issue.70 
The modern trend towards allowing nonmutual preclusion 
arguably began with the influential 1942 California case Bernhard v. 
 
 67. Semtek Int’l, 531 U.S. at 508–09; see also Vestal, supra note 66, at 1739, 1745. Some earlier 
decisions left ambiguity about which forum’s preclusion law applies and suggested the need for a 
case-by-case Erie Doctrine analysis. See Lynne Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston Print Works Co., 453 
F.2d 1177, 1181 (3d Cir. 1972) (“The question whether the federal court shall apply the state law of 
collateral estoppel is a close one, because of the tension between the ‘outcome-determinative’ test of 
Guaranty Trust and the relation to the state-created rights test of Byrd. Therefore, prudence indicates 
that the further analysis suggested by Byrd should also be explored.”). The rule from Semtek clarified 
that a federal court judgment’s preclusive effect should be analyzed under federal common law 
jurisprudence, but that the federal common law mandates use of state law when the federal court sat in 
diversity jurisdiction. See generally Semtek Int’l, 531 U.S. 497. 
 68. See Erichson, supra note 8, at 965–69. Issue preclusion generally applies even when another 
jurisdiction adjudicated the first lawsuit. Id. Further analysis of choice of law and issue preclusion 
between different states and court systems is beyond the scope of this Note. Importantly, however, “the 
most important [jurisdictional] split in preclusion law concerns mutuality.” Id. 
 69. See Schopler, supra note 17, § 4(a); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. L. INST. 
1982). 
 70. See, e.g., Atkinson v. White, 60 Me. 396, 401 (1872); Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 
9 N.E.2d 758, 759 (N.Y. 1937). The early state cases were not necessarily suggesting the abandonment 
of the mutuality requirement per se; rather, courts carved out exceptions to mutuality. See Good Health 
Dairy Prods., 9 N.E.2d at 759 (“An apparent exception to this rule of mutuality has been held to exist 
where the liability of the defendant is altogether dependent upon the culpability of one exonerated in a 
prior suit upon the same facts, when sued by the same plaintiff.” (quoting Bigelow v. Old Dominion 
Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1912))); Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 172 
A. 260, 263 (Del. Super. Ct. 1934) (allowing a broad public policy exception to mutuality). Notably, the 
exception based on vicarious liability and indemnification was widely accepted. See, e.g., Featherson v. 
Newburgh & C. Tpk. Co., 24 N.Y.S. 603, 605 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1893) (“The relation between [the 
defendant in the first case] and the [current] defendant was analogous to that of principal and agent, or 
principal and surety, or master and servant; and the rule in such cases is that a judgment in favor of the 
principal or the surety, upon a ground equally applicable to both, should be accepted as conclusive 
against the plaintiff’s right of action.” (citations omitted)). 
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Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n.71 In Bernhard, the 
California Supreme Court noted that many courts already applied 
broad exceptions to mutuality such as expanding the scope of privity 
and allowing nonmutual preclusion in cases of derivative liability or 
indemnity.72 After a thorough survey of scholarly materials and prior 
cases, the Bernhard court found “no compelling reason” and “[n]o 
satisfactory rationalization” for the maintenance of the traditional 
mutuality requirement.73 Instead, the court held that the rationale for 
permitting nonmutual defensive preclusion applies whether or not the 
defendants share a master–servant or agent–principal relationship: “It 
would be unjust to permit one who has had his day in court to reopen 
identical issues merely by switching adversaries.”74 Justice Traynor, 
writing for the California Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion, 
concluded that once a plaintiff has had a chance to litigate an issue, 
then that plaintiff should be bound by the resulting judgment, 
 
 71. 122 P.2d 892, 894–95 (Cal. 1942); see also Michael J. Waggoner, Fifty Years of Bernard v. Bank 
of America Is Enough: Collateral Estoppel Should Require Mutuality but Res Judicata Should Not, 12 
REV. LITIG. 391, 392 (1993) (“The law of who may invoke collateral estoppel . . . has developed . . . for 
fifty years, starting with Bernhard v. Bank of America.”). See generally Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of 
Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957). This case has been so 
influential to the development of the law on this matter that the abandonment of mutuality is often 
referred to as the “Bernhard doctrine.” See, e.g., Steven P. Nonkes, Reducing the Unfair Effects of 
Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Through Damages Limits, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1459, 1459 (2009). The 
U.S. Supreme Court cited Bernhard as persuasive authority in its landmark Blonder-Tongue case. 
Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 324 (1971). 
 72. Bernhard, 122 P.2d at 894–95. The court gave examples of derivative liability: “master and 
servant, principal and agent, and indemnitor and indemnitee.” Id. at 895. In those types of tort cases, if a 
court found that either the master or the servant (or the principal or agent, employer or employee, etc.) 
did not negligently cause the plaintiff’s injuries, then the plaintiff cannot relitigate the negligence issue 
by bringing a new suit against whichever party (either master or servant) that the plaintiff chose not to 
initially name in the first suit for the same alleged injuries. Id. 
 73. Id. at 892–95. The Bernhard case involved the estate of Clara Sather. Id. at 893. Before her 
death, Sather allowed Charles Cook to withdraw money from her bank account. Id. After her death, 
Cook and Sather’s heirs disputed the status of the funds transferred to Cook. Id. The probate court 
held—over Sather’s heirs’ objections—that Cook received the funds as a gift; thus, a proper accounting 
of the estate should not include those funds. Id. Helen Bernhard, Sather’s daughter, then filed a separate 
suit against the bank for transferring the funds to Cook. Id. The bank asserted a preclusion defense, 
citing the probate court’s prior ruling regarding the funds. Id. at 893–94. Despite not being a party to the 
probate court case (i.e., despite a lack of mutuality), the bank won the case. Id. at 894. 
 74. Id. at 895 (“The cases justify this [derivative liability] exception on the ground that it would be 
unjust to permit one who has had his day in court to reopen identical issues by merely switching 
adversaries.”). 
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regardless of any derivative liability or privity between defendants.75 
Courts throughout the country continue to cite this case as persuasive 
authority for the proposition of permitting nonmutual defensive issue 
preclusion.76 
A majority of states now follow the Bernhard doctrine and the rule 
from Blonder-Tongue and allow nonmutual defensive issue 
preclusion.77 A significant plurality of states allow both nonmutual 
defensive and nonmutual offensive issue preclusion in at least some 
circumstances.78 Only a very few states have declined to change the 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. See, e.g., Foster v. Plock, 394 P.3d 1119, 1123–24 (Colo. 2017) (recognizing that the “oft-cited” 
Bernhard case “has been universally understood and applied” as a case abandoning the mutuality 
requirement of issue preclusion). The Colorado Supreme Court in Foster also recognized a trend in early 
issue preclusion cases where courts used the term “res judicata” to mean both claim and issue 
preclusion, leading to confusion in how to correctly apply precedent. Id. In modern terminology, res 
judicata refers to claim preclusion, a similar but distinct doctrine from issue preclusion. Id. The court 
failed to find any jurisdiction that eliminated the mutuality requirement for claim preclusion. Id. at 
1124–25. 
 77. See, e.g., Chambers v. Ohio Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 145 F.3d 793, 801 n.14 (6th Cir. 1998) (“In 
Ohio, the general rule is that mutuality of parties is a prerequisite to the offensive use of issue 
preclusion.” (citing Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 443 N.E.2d 978 (Ohio 1983))); Doe v. 
Doe, 52 P.3d 255, 264–65 (Haw. 2002); Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Iowa 
1998) (“[I]ssue preclusion does not require mutuality of parties if it is being invoked defensively against 
a party so connected to the former action as to be bound by that resolution.” (citing Brown v. Kassouf, 
558 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Iowa 1997))); Rourke v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 863 A.2d 926, 938 (Md. 2004) 
(“[W]e have yet to formally embrace offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel.”); Monat v. State Farm 
Ins. Co., 677 N.W.2d 843, 852 (Mich. 2004); McInnis & Assocs., Inc. v. Hall, 349 S.E.2d 552, 560 
(N.C. 1986); Trinity Indus., Inc. v. McKinnon Bridge Co., 77 S.W.3d 159, 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) 
(“In Tennessee the offensive use of collateral estoppel requires that the parties be identical in both 
actions. Without saying so specifically, however, Tennessee has not required party mutuality in applying 
defensive collateral estoppel.” (citations omitted)), abrogated by Bowen ex rel. Doe v. Arnold, 502 
S.W.3d 102 (Tenn. 2016). 
 78. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Ariz. State Real Est. Dep’t, 727 P.2d 825, 828 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); 
Johnson v. Union Pac. R.R., 104 S.W.3d 745, 751 (Ark. 2003); Bassett v. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 
727 P.2d 864, 866 (Colo. App. 1986); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 596 A.2d 414, 422–23 (Conn. 
1991) (“[M]utuality of parties is no longer required to invoke collateral estoppel.”); Messick v. Star 
Enter., 655 A.2d 1209, 1210 (Del. 1995); Mastrangelo v. Sandstrom, Inc., 55 P.3d 298, 303 (Idaho 
2002); Herzog v. Lexington Twp., 657 N.E.2d 926, 930 (Ill. 1995); Tofany v. NBS Imaging Sys., Inc., 
616 N.E.2d 1034, 1037–38 (Ind. 1993); Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762, 766 (Me. 1979) (“[T]he 
doctrine of mutuality of estoppel should no longer govern the application of collateral estoppel in the 
courts of this State.”); Falgren v. State Bd. of Teaching, 545 N.W.2d 901, 907 (Minn. 1996); In re 
Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Mo. 1997); Cover v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 75 
N.W.2d 661, 668 (Neb. 1956); Cutter v. Town of Durham, 411 A.2d 1120, 1121 (N.H. 1980); Silva v. 
State, 745 P.2d 380, 384 (N.M. 1987) (“[T]he doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel may be applied 
when a plaintiff seeks to foreclose the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously 
litigated unsuccessfully regardless of whether plaintiff was privy to the prior action.”); Koch v. Consol. 
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strict mutuality rule.79 Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Georgia, North 
Dakota, and Virginia follow the strict mutuality standard.80 
C. Georgia Law 
Georgia courts usually do not use the term mutuality but instead 
use the synonymous phrase “identity of parties or their privies.”81 
 
Edison Co. of N.Y., 468 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 1984); In re Est. of Ellis, 333 A.2d 728, 730–31 (Pa. 1975); 
Doe v. Doe, 551 S.E.2d 257, 259 (S.C. 2001); Scott v. City of Newport, 857 A.2d 317, 321 (Vt. 2004) 
(“[W]e have abandoned the doctrine of mutuality . . . .” (citations omitted)); Sumpter ex rel. Michelle T. 
v. Crozier, 495 N.W.2d 327, 335 (Wis. 1993); Tex. W. Oil & Gas Corp. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Casper, 743 P.2d 857, 864–65 (Wyo. 1987). 
 79. See, e.g., Jones v. Blanton, 644 So. 2d 882, 886 (Ala. 1994) (“Although many courts, including 
the Federal courts, have dispensed with the mutuality requirement, it remains the law in Alabama.”); 
Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917, 919–20 (Fla. 1995) (“[W]e are unwilling to follow the lead of 
certain other states and of the federal courts in abandoning the requirements of mutuality in the 
application of collateral estoppel.”); Hofsommer v. Hofsommer Excavating, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 380, 384 
(N.D. 1992) (“For purposes of both res judicata and collateral estoppel in this state, only parties or their 
privies may take advantage of or be bound by the former judgment.”); Scales v. Lewis, 541 S.E.2d 899, 
901 (Va. 2001) (“[T]here also must be ‘mutuality,’ i.e., a litigant cannot invoke collateral estoppel 
unless he would have been bound had the litigation of the issue in the prior action reached the opposite 
result.” (quoting Angstadt v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 457 S.E.2d 86, 87 (Va. 1995))). 
 80. Erichson, supra note 8, at 966 (“A number of states cling to the traditional mutuality 
requirement. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Virginia require 
mutuality.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Cook Inlet Keeper v. State, 46 P.3d 957, 966 (Alaska 2002) 
(requiring mutuality for issue preclusion in Alaska). Although most sources cite Mississippi as among 
the states requiring strict mutuality, the matter may actually be unsettled. See Hoffheimer, supra note 6, 
at 524 (“Although some legal sources have claimed that Mississippi still requires mutuality, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court has expressly rejected mutuality as a precondition for collateral estoppel. At 
the same time, the Mississippi court’s opinions are not entirely consistent in explaining whether 
nonmutual preclusion is encouraged or disfavored.”). The Virginia Supreme Court acknowledged the 
modern trend but declined to adopt it and instead reaffirmed strict mutuality in 1987. Selected Risks Ins. 
Co. v. Dean, 355 S.E.2d 579, 581 (Va. 1987) (“We perceive no error, flagrant or otherwise, or mistake 
committed by the Court in 1980 in [Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 272 S.E.2d 217 (Va. 
1980)] when we declined to follow a ‘trend’ and abrogate the requirement of mutuality. Thus, we will 
follow our established precedent.”). Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court was not convinced by the 
judicial efficiency and economic arguments in favor of abandoning the mutuality requirement. Stogniew, 
656 So. 2d at 919–20 (“Further, we are unwilling to follow the lead of certain other states and of the 
federal courts in abandoning the requirements of mutuality in the application of collateral 
estoppel. . . . We are not convinced that any judicial economies which might be achieved by eliminating 
mutuality would be sufficient to affect our concerns over fairness for the litigants. We also note that 
many other courts continue to adhere to the doctrine of mutuality.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Nally v. Bartow Cnty. Grand Jurors, 633 S.E.2d 337, 339 (Ga. 2006) (“Collateral 
estoppel, like res judicata, requires identity of parties or privity.”); Daniel v. Daniel, 596 S.E.2d 608, 
611 (Ga. 2004) (“The collateral estoppel doctrine precludes the re-litigation of an issue previously 
adjudicated on the merits in an action between the same parties or their privies.”); see also Schopler, 
supra note 17 (“The mutuality requirement is closely related to, and for all practical purposes about 
coextensive with, the requirement of identity of parties or privity. It has been said that the requirement 
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Current Georgia law requires “identity of parties or their privies” in 
the first and the second lawsuits for a party to use issue preclusion.82 
The remaining elements of issue preclusion in Georgia largely mirror 
federal courts and black letter law.83 Issue preclusion in Georgia 
requires all of the following elements: (1) identity of issues, (2) 
actual litigation of the issue in the first action, (3) necessity of the 
issue to the outcome of the first action, and (4) the result of a final 
judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction in the 
first action.84 Notably, however, Georgia courts often apply issue 
preclusion law inconsistently and confuse the proper elements.85 
Although issue preclusion remains a common law doctrine, the 
legislature arguably codified some of its elements in a state statute 
providing that a judgment on an issue by a competent court binds the 
 
of identity of parties is commonly known as the requirement of mutuality.”). Some scholars “have also 
recognized that at least theoretically, there is some difference between [identity of parties and 
mutuality], and that to the extent that they are divergent, the requirement of mutuality is broader.” 
Schopler, supra note 17. However, for the purposes of this Note, the identity of parties element will be 
treated as the same as the strict mutuality requirement because the practical and policy considerations 
are identical, and Georgia courts have not distinguished the terms. See infra Section II.C. 
 82. Waldroup v. Greene Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 463 S.E.2d 5, 7 (Ga. 1995) (“Collateral estoppel 
precludes the re-adjudication of an issue that has previously been litigated and adjudicated on the merits 
in another action between the same parties or their privies.”); Minnifield v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 771 
S.E.2d 188, 192 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (“In Georgia, mutual identity of parties is required for collateral 
estoppel, which means that there must be an identity of parties or their privies in both actions.” (citations 
omitted)); Adams v. Adams, 738 F.3d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Under Georgia law, the doctrine of 
issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, ‘precludes the re-adjudication of an issue that has 
previously been litigated and adjudicated on the merits in another action between the same parties or 
their privies.’” (quoting Shields v. BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp., 545 S.E.2d 898, 900 (Ga. 2001))); 
Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 629 S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ga. 2006) (“The related doctrine of collateral 
estoppel ‘precludes the re-adjudication of an issue that has previously been litigated and adjudicated on 
the merits in another action between the same parties or their privies.’” (quoting Waldroup, 463 S.E.2d 
at 7)). 
 83. Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1264 (11th Cir. 2011). The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit distilled the elements of issue preclusion in Georgia: “A party seeking to assert 
collateral estoppel under Georgia law must demonstrate that (1) an identical issue, (2) between identical 
parties, (3) was actually litigated and (4) necessarily decided, (5) on the merits, (6) in a final judgment, 
(7) by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Morrison v. Morrison, 663 S.E.2d 714, 718 (Ga. 2008) (“Like other Georgia courts in the past, 
the superior court ‘fail[ed] to clearly and consistently distinguish the two separate doctrines’ of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel.” (quoting Sorrells Constr. Co. v. Chandler Armentrout & Roebuck, 447 
S.E.2d 101, 102 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994))). 
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parties to that judgment and their privies.86 The statute, however, 
does not prevent the judiciary from expanding preclusion law to 
nonmutual applications.87 The national trends notwithstanding, 
Georgia continues to uphold its status as a strict mutuality state.88 
II. ANALYSIS 
“If litigation were costless, both to the litigants and to society, it 
might be desirable never to allow collateral estoppel to preclude a 
new lawsuit. But as with most mortal endeavors, litigation is not so 
blessed.”89 This 1973 quotation from Judge Goldberg of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit encapsulates the necessary 
balancing of policy interests with fairness to litigants when applying 
issue preclusion law.90 Although scholars have thoroughly opined on 
the merits of nonmutual defensive and offensive preclusion, Georgia 
practitioners and litigants continue to grapple with the paucity of 
applicable case law from the state’s supreme court. Policy 
considerations favor mutuality law reform. However, likely due to 
apathy or inexplicable reluctance, the Georgia Supreme Court has 
 
 86. O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 (2015 & Supp. 2020) (“A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction 
shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which 
under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered 
until the judgment is reversed or set aside.”); see also Morrison, 663 S.E.2d at 719 (Benham, J., 
dissenting) (finding that the statute “codifies the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel”). 
However, although the elements of collateral estoppel are similar, some Georgia courts have interpreted 
this statute as only defining res judicata. See Hardwick v. Williams, 613 S.E.2d 215, 217 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2005) (“Under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 the principle of res judicata is defined as follows . . . .”). The fact 
that some Georgia courts use “res judicata” to encompass both issue and claim preclusion further 
complicates this situation. See, e.g., Waggaman v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 458 S.E.2d 826, 827 (Ga. 
1995); ALR Oglethorpe, LLC v. Henderson, 783 S.E.2d 187, 191 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). Regardless, most 
courts do not rely on this statute when applying the doctrine. 
 87. Cf. Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328, 350 (1971). 
(establishing nonmutual defensive issue preclusion as part of federal common law without an explicit 
statutory basis). 
 88. RICHARD C. RUSKELL, DAVIS AND SHULMAN’S GEORGIA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 27:5 
(2019–2020 ed. 2019) (“The Georgia Supreme Court has remained consistent in requiring that the 
elements of collateral estoppel require identity of parties or their privies in both actions.”). 
 89. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542, 549 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 90. Id. 
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failed to even consider the merits—or lack thereof—of the state’s 
current strict mutuality issue preclusion standard. 
A. Policy Considerations Favor Abandoning Strict Mutuality 
The policy reasons behind mutuality have been questioned for 
more than a century.91 In 1843, Jeremy Bentham famously described 
mutuality as “a maxim which one would suppose to have found its 
way from the gaming-table to the bench.”92 Prevailing academic and 
economic considerations favor the current trend towards nonmutual 
preclusion.93 State supreme courts have emphasized various 
rationales but have generally—with some notable exceptions—
weighed policy in favor of mutuality reform.94 Analyzing the policy 
considerations through case law of specific jurisdictions provides 
additional necessary context to the application of nonmutual 
preclusion. 
1. Purposes of Issue Preclusion Generally 
The traditionally understood policies underlying issue preclusion 
include finality of judgments, consistency of judgments, reliance on 
judgments, judicial economy, and repose.95 Reliance, finality, and 
consistency are intertwined: when litigants know that issue 
preclusion applies to a judgment, they can safely rely on the finality 
of that judgment and need not worry about forthcoming inconsistent 
 
 91. See JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 
165, 171 (John Bowring ed., 1843). 
 92. Id. This quotation was cited in Blonder-Tongue, Bernhard, and other leading cases. 
Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 322–23; Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892, 
895 (Cal. 1942). However, at least one scholar critiqued Bentham’s analogy and suggested that courts 
should stop relying on it. See generally Waggoner, supra note 71. 
 93. See, e.g., Cavanagh, supra note 23, at 286 (“[T]he standards developed in Parklane regarding 
offensive non-mutual issue preclusion and its progeny strike the proper balance . . . . [T]he current 
standards regarding issue preclusion are working, and any proposal to return to a mutuality regime 
would be an unfortunate step backward.”). 
 94. See discussion infra Sections II.A.1–4. 
 95. MOORE ET AL., supra note 7, § 132.01 ¶ 3; see also Brian M. Vines, A Doctrine of Faith and 
Credit, 94 VA. L. REV. 247, 249 (2008) (recognizing “reliance, repose, and finality” as the “core values” 
of issue preclusion). 
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decisions on an issue.96 Similarly, issue preclusion promotes repose 
by signaling to potential defendants that certain issues are settled and 
plaintiffs may not bring more claims based on those issues.97 Judicial 
economy refers to the time and resources saved by courts when 
preclusion prevents relitigation of an issue.98 In addition to saving 
taxpayers money, issue preclusion promotes the efficient use of court 
resources to hear other pending claims.99 Nonmutual preclusion 
enhances these policies by broadening the scope of issue preclusion 
and allowing litigants to assert issue preclusion more often.100 
2. Nonmutual Defensive vs. Nonmutual Offensive Policy 
Considerations 
After the Bernhard decision, attorneys and judges debated whether 
the holding should apply to all assertions of nonmutual preclusion or 
only to defensive issue preclusion.101 Justice Traynor’s conclusion 
finding “no compelling reason” and “[n]o satisfactory 
rationalization” for maintaining mutuality makes sense as applied to 
the facts of the case (a defensive assertion),102 but the policy 
 
 96. MOORE ET AL., supra note 7, § 132.01 ¶ 3. Promoting consistent decisions of an issue also 
promotes credibility of the court system and avoids judicial embarrassment resulting from inconsistent 
decisions of the same issue. Heyman v. Kline, 456 F.2d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting the court’s 
concern for embarrassment if two or more judges reach different conclusions on the same question of 
fact). 
 97. Repose, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Stephen Michael Sheppard ed., 2012) (“Repose is rest, a 
time or state of relief and quietude. In law, repose is the laying to rest of an action or claim, usually at a 
given time or after a period has elapsed.”). 
 98. MOORE ET AL., supra note 7, § 132.01 ¶ 3. 
 99. Schopler, supra note 17, § 2(a). By advancing this judicial efficiency, issue preclusion benefits 
the rights of other injured plaintiffs “who might [otherwise] have to wait to have their day in court 
because one litigant is allowed to litigate the same issue over and over again.” Id. The policies 
underlying issue preclusion should be viewed not only through the lens of the affected parties to one 
specific case, but also from the perspective of “the right of society to have its courts render justice as 
inexpensively as possible.” Id. 
 100. Id. (recognizing that abandoning mutuality equates to “extending the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel”); see also Cavanagh, supra note 23, at 298 (“[D]efensive non-mutual issue preclusion 
promote[s] the underlying goals of issue preclusion . . . .”). 
 101. See generally Currie, supra note 71. With regards to federal courts, the U.S. Supreme Court 
settled the debate when it “gave its imprimatur to [Justice] Traynor’s dramatic takedown of the 
mutuality rule in Bernhard.” Cavanagh, supra note 23, at 282. 
 102. Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892, 894–95 (Cal. 1942). 
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considerations differ when plaintiffs assert issue preclusion 
offensively.103 
In his frequently cited 1957 Stanford Law Review article, former 
University of Chicago Professor of Law Brainerd Currie examined 
the Bernhard doctrine and distinguished between offensive and 
defensive issue preclusion.104 Currie illustrated the distinction using a 
hypothetical in which a train crash injures fifty passengers.105 If one 
passenger sues the railroad for his injuries and the jury finds the 
railroad negligent, then the other forty-nine passengers could avail 
themselves of that judgment by asserting issue preclusion 
offensively.106 Currie opined that this railroad scenario unfairly 
benefits plaintiffs.107 If, however, in the same scenario the jury in the 
first case finds no negligence by the railroad-defendant, then the 
railroad could use that judgment to preclude future litigation of its 
negligence in the crash by asserting issue preclusion defensively.108 
Currie correctly noted that this latter situation (nonmutual defensive 
preclusion) does not implicate the same concerns of fairness because 
of plaintiffs’ strategic advantages in civil litigation.109 Plaintiffs 
typically have broad latitude for discretion in choosing when to file a 
claim and commence litigation, in which forum to file the claim, and 
with whom to join to their claim.110 Currie concluded that the 
 
 103. Currie, supra note 71, at 308–09. For background on the Bernhard case, see discussion supra 
Section I.B. 
 104. Currie, supra note 71; see also, e.g., Antonio Gidi, Loneliness in the Crowd: Why Nobody Wants 
Opt-Out Class Members to Assert Offensive Issue Preclusion Against Class Defendants, 66 SMU L. 
REV. 1, 7 (2013) (citing to Currie’s article and recognizing the article as “popular” with academics 
researching issue preclusion). Currie later categorized Justice Traynor’s opinion as “extirpat[ing] the 
mutuality requirement and put[ting] it to the torch.” William Sam Byassee, Collateral Estoppel Without 
Mutuality: Accepting the Bernhard Doctrine, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1982) (quoting Brainerd 
Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25, 26 (1965)). 
 105. Currie, supra note 71, at 281–82. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 288 (“Plaintiffs possess the initiative—a priceless strategic advantage in litigation as in 
war.”). 
 110. Id. (“Within broad limits, [plaintiffs] can determine the time when and the place where action is 
to be brought. Moreover, there is latitude for a considerable amount of collaboration between numbers 
of plaintiffs similarly situated . . . .”). 
24
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 8
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss2/8
2021] RELUCTANCE OR APATHY? 565 
Bernhard doctrine abandoning mutuality should only apply when 
defendants use issue preclusion defensively.111 
Defensive issue preclusion encourages plaintiffs with injuries 
stemming from the same event, such as the hypothetical plaintiffs in 
the train crash example, to join together in one action, thus giving 
them a fair opportunity to fully litigate the issues.112 If there are 
multiple potential defendants, then defensive preclusion would 
similarly incentivize a plaintiff to choose to join all defendants in one 
lawsuit.113 This consolidation of claims and parties prevents 
duplicative use of courts’ resources, and it allows defendants to 
divert their resources to more economically productive ends instead 
of squandering time and money to relitigate decided issues.114 
In this sense, defensive issue preclusion alleviates the “aura of the 
gaming table” created by the traditional mutuality requirement.115 
Bentham’s “gaming table” metaphor analogizes plaintiffs choosing 
new defendants with gamblers who may lose at one Blackjack table 
but can then try again with a new hand and have another chance to 
win.116 Under strict mutuality, plaintiffs can advance some arguments 
against one defendant, lose, choose a new defendant—and perhaps 
even a new forum or judge—and then attempt new arguments to try 
and prevail against the new defendant on the exact same issue.117 One 
 
 111. Currie, supra note 71, at 322. 
 112. Cavanagh, supra note 23, at 297–301. In contrast to invoking offensive issue preclusion (a 
“sword”), using issue preclusion defensively (a “shield”) “promote[s] the underlying goals of issue 
preclusion—peace, efficiency, and consistency.” Id. at 298–99. 
 113. Id. at 299–300. 
 114. Id. When a defendant must relitigate the same issue separately against new plaintiffs, “there is an 
arguable misallocation of resources.” Id. at 299 (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 
329 (1979)). Additionally, “the defendant’s time and money are diverted from alternative uses—
productive or otherwise—to relitigation of a decided issue.” Id. (quoting Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329). 
 115. Id. at 300 (quoting Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329). 
 116. BENTHAM, supra note 92, at 171. 
 117. Cavanagh, supra note 23, at 298–300. The article explains: 
And, still assuming that the issue was resolved correctly in the first suit, there is 
reason to be concerned about the plaintiff’s allocation of resources. Permitting 
repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of unrelated defendants 
holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming table or “a lack of discipline and of 
disinterestedness on the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for 
fashioning rules of procedure.” 
Id. at 299–300 (quoting Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971)). 
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single injury could give rise to unlimited claims as long as unrelated 
defendants exist.118 
These clear injustices and inefficiencies are not as pronounced 
when applying nonmutual offensive issue preclusion. Indeed, some 
commentators argue that offensive preclusion actually lessens 
judicial economy because it incentivizes plaintiffs to “wait and see” 
the holding of a “test case” by another similarly situated plaintiff 
instead of joining the suit.119 On the other hand, if the defendant 
knows that the result of the first plaintiff’s trial will affect the results 
of other foreseeable claims arising out of the same factual issues, 
then the rule incentivizes the defendant to more zealously defend that 
first case in the same way that the defendant would defend against a 
claim by joint plaintiffs.120 
Moreover, jurisdictions that allow nonmutual offensive issue 
preclusion recognize exceptions in cases where its application 
unfairly benefits the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant.121 The 
U.S. Supreme Court in Parklane listed a series of factors that lower 
federal courts should consider in their discretionary application of 
nonmutual offensive preclusion, including whether the first case 
provided the defendant with the same procedural opportunities, 
whether the defendant had similar incentives to litigate the issue in 
 
 118. Id. at 299. For example, suppose a pedestrian suffers injuries when he is struck by a car while 
crossing a busy street. Suppose further that, under unambiguous state law, pedestrians do not have a 
cognizable claim for injuries suffered as a result of illegal jaywalking. The pedestrian then sues the 
driver of the car that hit him and loses at trial after the trier of fact finds that the pedestrian was 
jaywalking. Because of the hypothetical state law, the dispositive fact that the plaintiff crossed the street 
illegally prevents him from obtaining damages for his injuries from any potentially negligent party. 
However, in a strict mutuality state like Georgia, the pedestrian could now step back up to the “gaming 
table” and bring a new suit against another driver, the car manufacturer, the road designer, the city, or 
any other potential defendant, and he would have the right to relitigate the issue of whether he 
jaywalked. Id. The plaintiff may lose three lawsuits, but a favorable jury in the fourth suit could find that 
he was not jaywalking, and he could proceed to proving damages. Id. 
 119. Id. at 305 (“[O]ffensive non-mutual issue preclusion may encourage a ‘wait and see’ attitude by 
plaintiffs and proliferation of litigation.” (quoting Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329–30)). 
 120. Erichson, supra note 8, at 950–52 (“If offensive nonmutual issue preclusion is allowed, a mass 
tort defendant—or any defendant facing a large number of lawsuits growing out of a single incident or 
related series of incidents—correctly perceives the first trial as a ‘must win’ situation.”). This example 
illustrates “how preclusion law affects zealousness of advocacy.” Id. at 952. 
 121. See, e.g., Parklane, 439 U.S. at 328–30. 
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the first case, and whether the plaintiff could have easily joined the 
first suit.122 The Parklane Court also referenced Professor Currie’s 
railroad hypothetical when it held that a party could not use 
preclusion offensively in cases of prior inconsistent decisions.123 
Allowing nonmutual offensive issue preclusion with these 
qualifications serves the dual functions of promoting the underlying 
policy goals of issue preclusion while preserving due process and 
fairness to all parties.124 
With regard to any assertion of issue preclusion—offensive or 
defensive—“the requirement of determining whether the party 
against whom an estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate is a most significant safeguard” against abuse and 
unfairness.125 More broadly, the party asserting issue preclusion must 
also meet the other elements of issue preclusion, including proving 
that the contested issue was actually litigated and decided in the first 
action.126 These other requirements provide additional safeguards 
against unfairness.127 
 
 122. Id. at 328–31. 
 123. Id. at 330 (“Allowing offensive collateral estoppel may also be unfair to a defendant if the 
judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more previous 
judgments in favor of the defendant.”). The Court explained that nonmutual offensive issue preclusion 
should not apply in circumstances like Currie’s hypothetical, which the court paraphrased: 
In Professor Currie’s familiar example, a railroad collision injures [fifty] passengers 
all of whom bring separate actions against the railroad. After the railroad wins the 
first [twenty-five] suits, a plaintiff wins in suit [twenty-six]. Professor Currie argues 
that offensive use of collateral estoppel should not be applied so as to allow plaintiffs 
[twenty-seven] through [fifty] automatically to recover. 
Id. at 330 n.14. 
 124. See generally Cavanagh, supra note 23. 
 125. Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971). 
 126. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3. 
 127. Cavanagh, supra note 23, at 304. Although “federal courts, most state courts, and the drafters of 
the Restatement” recognize nonmutual issue preclusion, “a sizable number of skeptics are still 
unconvinced.” Nonkes, supra note 71, at 1459. Commentators continue to propose novel ways for 
courts to maximize efficiency and fairness when applying issue preclusion, including “rules limiting the 
amount recoverable in damages by a plaintiff who relies upon offensive nonmutual issue preclusion to 
establish an element of the cause of action.” Id. 
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3. The Maine Supreme Court Provides More than a Century of 
Sound Policy Analysis Supporting Nonmutual Preclusion 
Examination of Maine’s common law is worthy of its own Section 
because it provides a holistic case study and a blueprint for other 
states to follow. The Maine Supreme Court has provided perhaps the 
most thorough analysis of the policy rationales for and against 
maintaining strict mutuality.128 
In the 1872 decision Atkinson v. White, the Maine Supreme Court 
explained that the mutuality requirement in the state originated from 
an ancient rule that prevented someone from acting both as a party 
and a witness in a case.129 Adhering to the mutuality requirement 
prevented the unfair result of a party asserting issue preclusion when 
he had to testify in the first case and therefore could not qualify as an 
adverse party.130 Because a statute had changed this party–witness 
rule, the court saw no reason to uphold strict mutuality and held that 
a party may assert nonmutual preclusion.131 
 
 128. See generally, e.g., Atkinson v. White, 60 Me. 396 (1872); Biddle & Smart Co. v. Burnham, 40 
A. 669 (Me. 1898); Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762 (Me. 1979). 
 129. Atkinson, 60 Me. at 399–400. 
 130. Id. The court explained the historical reasons for mutuality: 
But if we hold that the old principle, that “estoppels must be mutual,” is applicable to 
this case, ought we to be bound by it any longer? 
That law was adopted when parties could not be witnesses, and from a very 
tender care of suitors, lest by possibility injustice might be done. For it is said, and 
this appears to be the only reason on which the law is founded, that “if the adverse 
party was not also a party to the judgment offered in evidence, it may have been 
obtained upon his own testimony; in which case, to allow him to derive a benefit 
from it would be unjust.” 
Id. at 399. 
 131. Id. at 399–400. The court repeatedly questioned the reasons for continued adherence to the 
mutuality requirement in light of this change in witness rules: 
Since the statute, making parties and all interested persons witnesses, this foundation 
has been taken away. No danger of injustice from that source now exists; and the 
reason of the law having ceased, why should the law be retained? It should be 
remembered that this is not a question in which these parties alone have an interest. 
Other suitors, waiting for their turn should not be delayed by repeated trials of the 
same question, not required to secure justice. Public policy also requires that there 
should be an end of litigation. If this matter has been once adjudicated upon, even the 
defendants themselves cannot waive that adjudication if they would. It has become 
the law of the case, and binding upon all parties who have had an opportunity to be 
heard thereon. 
We can see no possible ground of suspicion even of injustice to the plaintiff in 
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The policy reasons that the Atkinson court articulated in 1872 still 
apply today.132 The court noted that justice would be delayed by 
parties “waiting for their turn” and relitigating the same issue 
repeatedly.133 Additionally, the court held that final judgments should 
stand as “binding upon all parties who have had an opportunity to be 
heard” and that “[p]ublic policy . . . requires that there should be an 
end of litigation.”134 Despite these well-articulated policy reasons, the 
Maine Supreme Court distinguished Atkinson when it revisited the 
mutuality issue in 1898 and held that “the rule requiring mutuality is 
too well established . . . to be lightly set aside.”135 
The Maine case study, however, does not end in the nineteenth 
century. After Parklane changed federal law in 1979, the plaintiff in 
Hossler v. Barry urged Maine to once again abandon mutuality.136 
True to form, the Maine Supreme Court thoroughly examined the 
available literature and analyzed the policy reasons favoring and 
opposing mutuality.137 The predominant policy argument in favor of 
the strict mutuality standard focused on preserving the illusion of 
fairness through symmetry—because the first lawsuit did not bind the 
litigant asserting nonmutual preclusion, that litigant should not have 
the benefit of asserting the decision of the first suit to his advantage 
when his adversary could not use it against him.138 As the court 
 
holding the former judgment against him conclusive. 
Id. 
 132. Id.; see also discussion supra Section II.A.2. 
 133. Atkinson, 60 Me. at 400. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Biddle & Smart Co. v. Burnham, 40 A. 669, 671 (Me. 1898) (“We do not find that the 
suggestion of the court in [Atkinson] has ever been adopted, here or elsewhere, and it seems to us that 
the rule requiring mutuality is too well established by authority, and rests upon too substantial reasons, 
to be lightly set aside.”). 
 136. Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762, 766 (Me. 1979) (“Rather, plaintiff urges the Court to abandon 
the doctrine because it ‘does not comport with modern theories of jurisprudence.’”). 
 137. See id. at 766–70. 
 138. Id. at 767 (“The doctrine was premised on the belief that it would be fundamentally unfair to 
allow a party who was an entire stranger to the first suit to use that judgment in a subsequent action 
since, as a stranger, the judgment in the first suit could not be used against him.”). A party to the first 
lawsuit cannot assert issue preclusion against a new party (i.e., a stranger) in the second lawsuit because 
constitutional due process requirements mandate that each party must have at least one “opportunity to 
be heard.” Id. at 767 n.5. The Third Circuit confronted—and disagreed with—a similar argument for 
maintaining “symmetry” in Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1950). See supra 
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pointed out, however, that view fails to explain why a party deserves 
more than one opportunity to litigate the same issue.139 Rather, a rule 
allowing nonmutual defensive issue preclusion ensures that plaintiffs 
actually fully litigate their issue by obligating them to join all 
potential defendants in one lawsuit.140 The Hossler opinion 
approvingly cited the Atkinson case, as well as Bernhard, Blonder-
Tongue, and other authorities, to conclude that “there was no tenable 
reason” not to allow defensive issue preclusion.141 
However, because the facts of the Hossler case involved a plaintiff 
attempting to assert issue preclusion against a stranger-defendant, the 
court also analyzed the more nuanced policy arguments regarding 
allowing offensive issue preclusion.142 In contrast to defensive 
preclusion, offensive preclusion assertions by a new plaintiff do not 
necessarily encourage judicial economy because a plaintiff can 
theoretically use a wait-and-see approach.143 If another 
similarly-situated plaintiff resolves the decisive issue, such as 
negligence, against the same defendant, then the new plaintiff can file 
a new suit and assert issue preclusion instead of joining the first 
lawsuit.144 Despite these concerns, the court held that nonmutual 
offensive issue preclusion may be allowed on a case-by-case basis 
after a court applies Parklane-esque fairness factors to the factual 
circumstances.145 
 
notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
 139. Hossler, 403 A.2d at 767 (“[W]hile every party was entitled to his day in court there was no 
tenable reason why a litigant should have more than one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution 
of the same issue.”). 
 140. Id. at 768 (“When used defensively, collateral estoppel encourages a plaintiff to join all potential 
defendants in a single action since if he sues and loses he will not be entitled to a second bite at the 
apple.”). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 764, 768–70. 
 143. Id. at 768 (“The offensive use, by contrast, does not promote judicial economy since a plaintiff 
has every incentive to avoid suit until a prior plaintiff has obtained a judgment against the defendant.”). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Hossler, 403 A.2d at 769 (“We are persuaded that the reasons justifying collateral estoppel 
would generally be advanced by permitting its use offensively on a case-by-case basis. . . . Many factors 
have been considered in determining whether the defendant has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
in the prior suit . . . .”). Although the court used this opportunity to articulate that the law now allows 
offensive issue preclusion, the court held that its use under the facts of this case would be unfair to the 
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4. States Choosing to Retain Mutuality Fail to Articulate Any 
Novel Rationales 
Issue preclusion law has trended away from strict mutuality for 
many years.146 However, even in light of modern trends, a few states 
have chosen to retain the mutuality element.147 
In the aftermath of Blonder-Tongue, Florida appellate courts 
approvingly cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning and began 
allowing nonmutual applications of issue preclusion.148 A 1992 
article in the Florida Bar Journal even applauded “the silent demise 
of the mutuality requirement” in the state.149 Despite this apparent 
consensus, the Florida Supreme Court explicitly reaffirmed the 
traditional mutuality requirement in 1995 in Stogniew v. McQueen.150 
The court agreed with its reasoning in earlier cases that the judicial 
economy benefits of nonmutual defensive preclusion are overstated 
because allowing nonmutual defensive preclusion can lead to 
additional appeals by the plaintiff.151 The court did not cite any 
statistics or other evidence to support that proposition.152 As the court 
 
defendant. Id. at 770. The court reasoned that the defendant “could not reasonably have foreseen either 
that the presiding Justice would abrogate a long-standing common-law rule or its reformulation on 
appeal in terms of a full and fair opportunity to litigate.” Id. 
 146. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464. 
 147. See sources cited supra note 80. 
 148. Donald A. Blackwell, The Silent Demise of the Mutuality Requirement in the Defensive Use of 
Collateral Estoppel, 66. FLA. BAR J. 18, 18 (1992) (“[T]he Third and Second district courts of appeal 
have made it clear that, at long last, Florida courts have fully embraced the rule of Blonder-Tongue and 
its progeny permitting the defensive use of collateral estoppel in the absence of strict mutuality.”). 
 149. See generally id. 
 150. 656 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1995); see also Deric Zacca, Florida’s Position on Nonmutual Collateral 
Estoppel After Stogniew, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 889, 889, 899 (1998). 
 151. See Stogniew, 656 So. 2d at 919–20 (first citing Trucking Emps. of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. 
v. Romano, 450 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1984), superseded by statute, FLA. STAT. § 772.14 (1986), as 
recognized in Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 1995); and then citing Zeidwig v. Ward, 
548 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989)). Under section 772.14, “Florida courts continue to require the mutuality of 
parties in deciding whether to give preclusive effect to a prior civil judgment. [But] Florida law does not 
require the mutuality of parties for criminal judgments.” Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 
993 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). For a thorough discussion of mutuality and issue preclusion 
law in Florida, see Zacca, supra note 150. 
 152. See generally Stogniew, 656 So. 2d 917; Romano, 450 So. 2d 843. 
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hinted in a prior case, perhaps its true motivation was retaining 
support from the plaintiffs’ bar.153 
Virginia also examined the issue and opted to continue requiring 
mutuality.154 The precedential decisions of the Virginia Supreme 
Court, however, only address and rebut arguments for offensive 
preclusion use.155 The court concluded that because nonmutual 
offensive preclusion raises significant fairness concerns, the state 
should not adopt any modern mutuality principles.156 Due to these 
holdings, Virginia remains a strict mutuality state even though the 
Virginia Supreme Court has not thoroughly addressed the meritorious 
arguments for allowing only defensive preclusion.157 
B. Distinguishing Mutuality from Privity 
Nonmutuality and privity are both ways for courts to allow 
nonparties—nonparties to the prior litigation—to assert issue 
preclusion.158 Nonmutuality determines if a named party in one 
 
 153. Romano, 450 So. 2d at 846 (“[W]e are not convinced that the burden under which the plaintiffs’ 
bar now labors is so onerous that defendants’ rights should be compromised to ease it. Plaintiffs have 
been equal to proving all the elements of liability heretofore. To change the status quo risks prejudice to 
defendants which is not necessary to serve the ends of justice.”). 
 154. Weinberger v. Tucker, 510 F.3d 486, 491 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[I]n Virginia, collateral estoppel 
requires a fourth element, mutuality.”). 
 155. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 272 S.E.2d 217, 220 (Va. 1980). Norfolk is the 
leading Virginia case on mutuality. See generally id. Because the party attempting to assert mutuality in 
that case was the plaintiff, the court addressed only the arguments for offensive mutuality. Id. at 220. 
Even though the court said that “the established rule is that collateral estoppel requires 
mutuality, . . . especially when the estoppel is used ‘offensively,’” subsequent Virginia Supreme Court 
decisions reaffirmed that defensive issue preclusion was similarly not permitted. Id. at 219 (citations 
omitted); see also Rawlings v. Lopez, 591 S.E.2d 691, 692 (Va. 2004) (“In Bailey, this Court reaffirmed 
Virginia’s adherence to the principle of mutuality . . . .”). 
 156. See Bailey, 272 S.E.2d at 219–20. 
 157. See Weinberger, 510 F.3d at 491; Rawlings, 591 S.E.2d at 692; Angstadt v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 
457 S.E.2d 86, 87 (Va. 1995). Because all of these recent state supreme court cases involved the 
attempted use of offensive issue preclusion, the court has not recently been directly confronted with 
potentially applying preclusion defensively. Cf. Weinberger, 510 F.3d at 491; Rawlings, 591 S.E.2d at 
692; Angstadt, 457 S.E.2d at 87. The court has not addressed many of the favorable arguments toward 
allowing defensive preclusion while still forbidding offensive uses. See, e.g., Weinberger, 510 F.3d at 
491; Rawlings, 591 S.E.2d at 692; Angstadt, 457 S.E.2d at 87. Nevertheless, these decisions make clear 
that current Virginia law requires mutuality for the assertion of issue preclusion either defensively or 
offensively. See, e.g., Weinberger, 510 F.3d at 491; Rawlings, 591 S.E.2d at 692; Angstadt, 457 S.E.2d 
at 87. 
 158. See Bone, supra note 18, at 253. 
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lawsuit should have an opportunity to relitigate an issue in a second 
lawsuit.159 Privity involves a nonparty having been deemed to have 
had an opportunity to litigate without actually having been named as 
a party in a prior lawsuit.160 Privity often implicates constitutional 
due process concerns.161 
Courts across jurisdictions have found privity between parties 
without much scrutiny, and many courts have used the finding of 
privity as a workaround to the mutuality requirement.162 As one court 
stated: “Privity is essentially a shorthand statement that collateral 
estoppel is to be applied in a given case; there is no universally 
applicable definition of privity.”163 
In the 2008 case Taylor v. Sturgell, the U.S. Supreme Court, 
recognizing due process concerns, narrowed the definition of privity 
by limiting privity’s application in preclusion cases to six specific 
categories of relationships between parties.164 The Court rejected the 
“virtual representation” theory of privity that some lower courts had 
used to expand the notion of privity.165 In rejecting virtual 
representation, the Court recognized that the lack of defined 
categories had given lower courts broad discretion to apply privity, 
which resulted in inconsistent decisions and erosion of due process 
 
 159. See supra Part I. 
 160. See Bone, supra note 18, at 226 n.120. 
 161. See id. at 236–37 & n.160. 
 162. See, e.g., Lynch v. Glass, 119 Cal. Rptr. 139, 141–42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); see also Hoffheimer, 
supra note 6, at 524 (“To add to the confusion, a few opinions have formally approved of the need for 
identity of parties in dictum yet permitted nonmutual collateral estoppel by making unnecessary findings 
of privity.”). 
 163. Lynch, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 141–42 (citations omitted). 
 164. 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008). The Court held in Taylor that for a nonparty to a prior case to 
assert preclusion in a second case under a privity theory, the party against whom preclusion is asserted 
must either: (1) have agreed to be bound by the issues decided in the first case; (2) have a prior legal 
relationship such as succeeding ownership of property; (3) have been “adequately represented” in the 
first case (the Court gave the example of a class action); (4) have “assumed control” over the first case; 
(5) have a formal representative relationship with the party in the first case such as an agency 
relationship; or (6) be subject to certain statutes that ensure due process to the litigants. Id. 
 165. Id. at 895–901 (“Reaching beyond these six established categories, some lower courts have 
recognized a ‘virtual representation’ exception to the rule against nonparty preclusion.”). 
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protections.166 Before this decision, federal courts had essentially 
permitted nonparty preclusion on an unpredictable, ad hoc basis.167 
Although the Taylor decision now binds federal courts, state courts 
continue to apply privity arbitrarily, and Georgia remains one of the 
biggest culprits.168 The Georgia Supreme Court defined a privy as 
“one who is represented at trial and who is in law so connected with a 
party to the judgment as to have such an identity of interest that the 
party to the judgment represented the same legal right.”169 However, 
in the same case, the supreme court also said that “no definition of 
‘privity’” can apply equally to all issue preclusion cases and that 
“privity depends on the circumstances.”170 
This loose definition, coupled with its circumstantial qualification, 
results in problems similar to those in pre-Taylor federal courts: 
inconsistent decisions and overly broad discretionary authority.171 
For instance, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a mother seeking 
child support is not in privity with the child support agency also 
seeking recovery of the same child support payments, even though 
the agency “stands, to some degree, in the shoes of the party seeking 
support.”172 A few years later, the same court found privity between 
two people solely based on their similar interests “as residents and 
voters” of the same county.173 One Georgia trial court explained the 
current rules as essentially permitting preclusion whenever the 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See infra Section II.C. 
 169. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549, 551 (Ga. 2006) (quoting Butler v. 
Turner, 555 S.E.2d 427, 430 (Ga. 2001)). 
 170. Id. (quoting Satsky v. Paramount Commc’ns, 7 F.3d 1464, 1468–69 (10th Cir. 1993)). 
 171. Id.; see also Taylor, 553 U.S. at 891–907. 
 172. Butler, 555 S.E.2d at 430 (“While in a support proceeding, the [Department of Human Resources 
(DHR)] stands, to some degree, in the shoes of the party seeking support, it does not have a complete 
identity of interest.” (citation omitted)); see also Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Fleeman, 439 S.E.2d 474, 475 
(Ga. 1994) (“Because the child is not bound by the provisions of the divorce decree, collateral estoppel 
does not bar DHR in its claim under O.C.G.A. § 19-11-6(a) insofar as DHR is pursuing that claim on the 
child’s behalf.” (citations omitted)). 
 173. Lilly v. Heard, 761 S.E.2d 46, 50–51 (Ga. 2014). 
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party-to-be-estopped appears “substantially similar” to a party in the 
earlier lawsuit.174 
Other cases further illustrate the reality that judges under a strict 
mutuality regime often stretch the bounds of privity to alleviate the 
burden of having to rehear the same issues.175 One court described 
this dilemma bluntly: “We stand at a juncture, unwilling to embark in 
an exercise of ‘metaphysical privity,’ yet faced with the 
uncomforting thought that our prior decisions would possibly allow 
appellants to litigate an identical issue against countless future 
competitors without any res judicata or collateral estoppel effect.”176 
Allowing nonmutual issue preclusion gives courts a tool to render 
efficient judgments without wading into the murky waters of privity 
law. 
C. Georgia Supreme Court Decisions 
Unlike other states’ highest courts, the Georgia Supreme Court has 
not thoroughly addressed and analyzed the mutuality issue since the 
Blonder-Tongue and Parklane cases changed federal law.177 Instead, 
every time the court hears an issue preclusion case, it simply restates 
 
 174. Plaintiff’s Response to Auto-Owners Ins. Co.’s Motion in Limine at *2–3, Dolan v. Air 
Mechanix, LLC, No. STCV1003011, 2015 WL 13707576 (Ga. State Ct. Nov. 30, 2015) (“[C]ollateral 
estoppel and/or res judicata should not apply here. . . . [I]f the parties in the declaratory judgment and 
tort actions are not the same, or substantially similar in both actions, the doctrines do not apply.”). 
 175. See generally, e.g., Coffee Iron Works v. QORE, Inc., 744 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. 2013). In Coffee Iron 
Works, the court held that issue preclusion prevented a stockholder of the prior-case plaintiff corporation 
and bond guarantor of the prior-case plaintiff from relitigating issues. Id. at 118–19. The defendant 
moved for summary judgment and argued that the plaintiffs’ privity with the plaintiffs in the prior case 
should preclude this new lawsuit. Id. at 117. Of course, if Georgia allowed nonmutual defensive issue 
preclusion, that would have been a clear winning argument for the defendants at the trial court level and 
the second case likely would not have even been brought, much less appealed. See Hoffheimer, supra 
note 6, at 573 (consolidating cases where courts “have reached the right result—rejecting mutuality in 
fact—but they have done so by making unnecessary (and arguably erroneous) findings of privity”). 
 176. Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Felco Jewel Indus., Co., 336 N.W.2d 153, 158 (S.D. 1983). 
 177. See generally RUSKELL, supra note 88. As of November 16, 2020, WestLaw and LexisNexis 
searches for all Georgia Supreme Court cases since Parklane had not revealed any case including a 
discussion of the arguments for and against mutuality. The search results also indicated that the 
Parklane decision had only been cited by the Georgia Supreme Court on one occasion, in a criminal 
appeal, which was decided on other grounds. See Giddens v. State, 786 S.E.2d 659, 664 n.4 (Ga. 2016). 
This case is discussed further infra. 
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the traditional elements and enforces mutuality accordingly.178 When 
defining the issue preclusion rule, Georgia courts most often cite 
Waldroup v. Greene County Hospital Authority, a 1995 Georgia 
Supreme Court case.179 The Waldroup opinion clears up lower court 
confusion regarding the distinctions between claim and issue 
preclusion and lays out the elements of each defense, but the court’s 
mutuality analysis ends there.180 The discussion instead focuses on 
how to determine if an issue was actually litigated and decided.181 
In Norris v. Atlanta & West Point Railroad Co., the Georgia 
Supreme Court enforced mutuality when it repudiated a troubling 
new rule articulated by the court of appeals as the “doctrine of 
binding precedent.”182 The lower court had essentially redefined the 
concept of precedent by allowing a litigant to assert issue preclusion 
against a nonparty to the prior lawsuit.183 The Georgia Supreme 
 
 178. See generally, e.g., Body of Christ Overcoming Church of God v. Brinson, 696 S.E.2d 667 (Ga. 
2010); Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 629 S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ga. 2006); In re T.M.G., 570 S.E.2d 
327 (Ga. 2002); Morrison v. Morrison, 663 S.E.2d 714, 718 (Ga. 2008); Brock v. Yale Mortg. Corp., 
700 S.E.2d 583 (Ga. 2010). 
 179. See, e.g., Copelan v. Copelan, 755 S.E.2d 739, 740 (Ga. 2014); In re T.M.G., 570 S.E.2 at 329; 
Gwinnett Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Comput. Servs., 538 S.E.2d 746, 748 (Ga. 
2000); Eichenblatt v. Piedmont/Maple, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 616, 620 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017); Dove v. Ty 
Cobb Healthcare Sys., 729 S.E.2d 58, 61 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012); Carroll Anesthesia Assocs., P.C. v. 
Anesthecare, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 829, 833 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). The cited passage—repeated in dozens of 
lower court opinions—reads as follows: 
Collateral estoppel precludes the re-adjudication of an issue that has previously been 
litigated and adjudicated on the merits in another action between the same parties or 
their privies. Like res judicata, collateral estoppel requires the identity of the parties 
or their privies in both actions. However, unlike res judicata, collateral estoppel does 
not require identity of the claim—so long as the issue was determined in the previous 
action and there is identity of the parties, that issue may not be re-litigated, even as 
part of a different claim. Furthermore, collateral estoppel only precludes those issues 
that actually were litigated and decided in the previous action, or that necessarily had 
to be decided in order for the previous judgment to have been rendered. Therefore, 
collateral estoppel does not necessarily bar an action merely because the judgment in 
the prior action was on the merits. Before collateral estoppel will bar consideration of 
an issue, that issue must actually have been decided. 
Waldroup v. Greene Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 463 S.E.2d 5, 7–8 (Ga. 1995) (footnotes omitted). 
 180. Waldroup, 463 S.E.2d at 7–8. 
 181. Id. 
 182. 333 S.E.2d 835, 836 (Ga. 1985) (“We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the 
‘doctrine of binding precedent’ should be recognized in Georgia. We conclude that it should not.”). 
 183. Id. at 837 (“As used by the Court of Appeals the ‘doctrine’ is a species of collateral estoppel in 
which no privity is required.”). 
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Court reversed that decision and correctly noted that “due process 
requires that the one who has not had his day in court will not be 
barred by a prior adjudication.”184 The Norris court, however, did not 
take the opportunity to address the less obvious questions presented 
by issue preclusion assertions against a party who meets the 
day-in-court prerequisite.185 
Precisely such an opportunity presented itself more overtly in 
Nally v. Bartow County Grand Jurors—a case whose factual 
underpinnings offered perhaps the most justifiable vehicle for 
mutuality reform.186 In that case, the Georgia Supreme Court 
implicitly acknowledged the potential inefficiencies of the mutuality 
requirement of issue preclusion while simultaneously reaffirming the 
Waldroup rule that prohibits such preclusion.187 In fact, the Nally 
court arguably affirmed a holding on nonmutual defensive issue 
preclusion grounds, albeit without saying so or declaring any new 
precedential rule.188 
In its appellate brief asserting a preclusion defense, the 
defendant-appellee in Nally explicitly conceded that the parties in the 
separate suits were not identical (i.e., there was no mutuality).189 The 
Georgia Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed the dismissals, 
reasoning that “[i]t is axiomatic that the same issue cannot be 
 
 184. Id. at 838. 
 185. See id. at 837–38. 
 186. 633 S.E.2d 337 (Ga. 2006). The facts of the Nally case illustrate how Georgia’s mutuality rule 
can squander judicial resources and incentivize repetitive, often-frivolous litigation. See id. at 338–39. 
The plaintiff had filed three separate lawsuits seeking a declaration of his alleged right to present 
arguments to a grand jury as a private citizen. Id. at 338. He brought the first suit in 2002 against the 
district attorney; the second suit, in June 2005, against the Bartow County Grand Jury; and the third suit, 
in September 2005, against each of the individual members of the grand jury. Id. at 338–39. The trial 
court, relying on the prior dismissal on the merits of the 2002 suit, dismissed the two 2005 lawsuits on 
preclusion grounds. Id. at 339. The plaintiff then appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court. Id. 
 187. Id. at 339–40. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Brief of Appellees at 21, Nally, 633 S.E.2d 337 (No. S06A0487), 2005 GA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
77, at *37 (“The Appellant has not enumerated any additional facts or legal premise which would 
preclude the application of res judicata or estoppel by judg[]ment. While the member[s] of the panel 
were not specifically named as parties in [the prior case], the Appellant seeks the very same legal result. 
While the dance partners may be different, the same song plays on.”). 
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relitigated ad infinitum.”190 In the very same paragraph, the court 
perplexingly explained its holding by quoting the prior case law, 
reaffirming that “[c]ollateral estoppel, like res judicata, requires 
identity of parties or privity.”191 However, the short opinion included 
no analysis of whether any of the defendants were in privity with one 
another.192 The court instead justified its ruling on the basis that the 
adjudication of the issue had been “conclusively established” in the 
first lawsuit.193 The court concluded that “the trial court correctly 
dismissed the complaint wherein [the plaintiff] had raised the 
identical claim for the third time.”194 Perhaps the justices felt no 
pressure to address mutuality in this case because the pro se 
plaintiff-appellant did not argue the point in his “handwritten 
motion” or briefs.195 The Nally case remains a uniquely frustrating 
oddity in Georgia issue preclusion jurisprudence, and lower courts 
have not cited it as authority to apply nonmutual preclusion in other 
cases. 
In Brock v. Yale Mortgage Corp., the Georgia Supreme Court 
addressed a party’s attempted assertion of nonmutual preclusion in a 
two-sentence footnote, simply stating that issue preclusion could not 
apply because the party asserting it “was neither a party nor in privity 
with a party in the divorce proceedings.”196 The court reflexively 
 
 190. Nally, 633 S.E.2d at 339 (quoting Johnson v. State, 612 S.E.2d 29, 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)). 
 191. Id. at 339 (quoting Hardwick v. Williams, 613 S.E.2d 215 (Ga. 2005)). 
 192. See id. at 339–40. 
 193. Id. at 339. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. (“However, his handwritten motion contained in the record does not state any specific 
grounds . . . .”). 
 196. 700 S.E.2d 583, 589 n.5 (Ga. 2010) (citing Waldroup v. Greene Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 463 S.E.2d 5 
(Ga. 1995)). In the footnote, the court declined to further consider the defendant-appellee’s attempted 
assertion beyond simply stating the following: 
Yale argues for the first time on appeal that Brock is collaterally estopped by the final 
judgment in the divorce proceedings from litigating whether Yale’s security interest 
attaches to the entire property. Pretermitting its procedural default, collateral estoppel 
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cited Waldroup and ended its analysis without any mention of the 
recent evolution of preclusion law.197 
The closest thing to an analysis of nonmutual issue preclusion in 
the Georgia Supreme Court’s published decisions also came in a 
footnote—in dicta—to a criminal appeal.198 Without reference to the 
relevant Georgia case law, Justice Nahmias cited Parklane for the 
proposition that “collateral estoppel can apply both offensively and 
defensively in the civil context.”199 Justice Nahmias’s footnote then 
cited cases from other jurisdictions regarding the application of 
offensive issue preclusion in criminal cases.200 Notably, the court did 
not cite any of its own precedent regarding mutuality but rather 
focused on the constitutional applications of issue preclusion in the 
criminal context.201 However, that dicta has not had any precedential 
value; lower courts continue to be bound by traditional issue 
preclusion elements in civil cases.202 
D. Lower Courts in Georgia 
Lower appellate and even trial courts in Georgia have recognized 
the potential absurdities of strict mutuality and have attempted to 
persuade the state supreme court justices to change the law.203 These 
attempts have been unsuccessful.204 To the extent the Georgia 
Supreme Court has heard those cases on appeal, it has not followed 
or even analyzed the reasoning.205 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. Giddens v. State, 786 S.E.2d 659, 664 n.4 (Ga. 2016). 
 199. Id. (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333–38 (1979)). The holding of the case 
ultimately does not disrupt the elements of issue preclusion under Georgia law. Id. 
 200. Id. (“[M]ost courts have refused to apply collateral estoppel offensively against the defendant in 
criminal cases.” (first citing State v. Scarbrough, 181 S.W.3d 650, 655–57 (Tenn. 2005); and then citing 
United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 890–98 (3d Cir. 1994))). 
 201. See id. 
 202. See RUSKELL, supra note 88. 
 203. See, e.g., Wickliffe I, 489 S.E.2d 153, 156 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, No. S97C1859, 
1998 Ga. LEXIS 185 (Ga. Jan. 5, 1998). 
 204. See, e.g., Wickliffe Co. v. Wickliffe (Wickliffe II), No. S97C1859, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 185, at *185 
(Ga. Jan. 5, 1998). 
 205. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
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1. Evolution of Mutuality Law in the Georgia Court of Appeals 
Some courts initially tried to adopt the modern view of allowing 
nonmutual preclusion.206 From 1984 to 1993, Georgia appellate 
courts began allowing litigants to assert issue preclusion even if they 
had not been parties to the first lawsuit that decided the issue.207 This 
line of cases originated with the Georgia Court of Appeals case Watts 
v. Lippitt.208 In a short opinion, the Watts court allowed the defendant 
to prevail on an issue preclusion defense “even though, strictly 
speaking, [the defendant] was not in privity with the defendants in 
[the prior] action.”209 The court cited the American Jurisprudence 
encyclopedia and federal cases as persuasive authority in its decision 
to adopt the “modern trend” of nonmutual issue preclusion.210 
Following that decision, other Georgia courts quoted that language 
and allowed litigants to assert issue preclusion both defensively and 
 
 206. See Wickliffe I, 489 S.E.2d at 155–56 (acknowledging a line of cases adopting the modern trend). 
 207. See Ervin v. Swift Adhesives, Inc., 430 S.E.2d 133, 134–35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming 
summary judgment for a chemical manufacturer defendant based on the defendant’s assertion of 
nonmutual defensive issue preclusion because the defendant’s liability had already been decided in the 
plaintiff’s prior workers’ compensation claim against her employer); Wilson v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, 
402 S.E.2d 291, 293–94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing nonmutual offensive issue preclusion); see also 
Winters v. Pund, 346 S.E.2d 124, 127 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (“[I]n modern legal practice, the central issue 
in determining whether the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply is whether the party 
against whom the plea is raised has had full opportunity to litigate the issues.” (citing Watts v. Lippitt, 
320 S.E.2d 581, 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984))). 
 208. 320 S.E.2d at 582–83; see also Ervin, 430 S.E.2d at 134 (quoting Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 582–83); 
Wilson, 402 S.E.2d at 293 (same); Winters, 346 S.E.2d at 127 (citing Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 583). 
 209. Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 582–83. Watts arguably stood for an even broader application of issue 
preclusion than allowed in other jurisdictions because the issue of the defendant’s liability was decided 
by a release that plaintiffs executed related to settlement of their first lawsuit. Id.; see also MOORE ET 
AL., supra note 7, § 132.03 (“As a general rule, a fact established in prior litigation not by judicial 
resolution but by stipulation has not been actually litigated and therefore . . . is not deemed to be 
‘actually litigated . . . .’”). The plaintiffs in Watts were barred from bringing a subsequent medical 
malpractice claim against a physician who treated the plaintiff for an injury after a car crash because the 
executed release signed with the other driver—the defendant in the first action—prevented the plaintiffs 
from holding any other person or entity liable for any injury that may have been related to the crash. 
Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 582. The court explained that the plaintiffs had an opportunity to name the 
physician as a defendant in the first lawsuit, and therefore, “the plaintiffs have had a full and complete 
opportunity to litigate the applicability of the release [to the physician].” Id. at 583. 
 210. Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 583. The court cited 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments §§ 522, 523 (2020), and 
Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp., 517 F.2d 117, 122–23 (5th Cir. 1975), to apply 
the “modern trend.” Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 583. 
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offensively.211 However, during the same time period, other Georgia 
appellate courts continued to apply strict mutuality.212 
The Georgia Court of Appeals resolved this discrepancy—in a 
nine-judge opinion without dissent—in the 1997 case Wickliffe v. 
Wickliffe Co.213 The court found that the facts satisfied all other 
elements of issue preclusion, and the case necessarily turned on 
which mutuality doctrine applied.214 To their credit, and unlike the 
Georgia Supreme Court, the judges addressed arguments in favor of 
adopting a nonmutuality standard.215 The court also acknowledged 
the “modern trend,” cited the Second Restatement of Judgments, and 
actually opined that “the modern trend regarding mutuality is perhaps 
the better position.”216 Ultimately, however, the Wickliffe court held 
that it was bound to follow the Georgia Supreme Court, and under 
that precedent, issue preclusion required identity of parties or 
 
 211. See Ervin, 430 S.E.2d at 134 (quoting Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 582–83); Wilson, 402 S.E.2d at 293 
(same); Winters, 346 S.E.2d at 127 (citing Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 583). The full rule as stated by the Watts 
court read: 
The modern trend in applying the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel is to 
confine the privity requirement to the party against whom the plea is asserted, so as to 
permit one who is not a party to the judgment to assert the judgment against a party 
who is bound by it, and thus to preclude relitigation by that party of issues which 
have been determined adversely to him in the prior action, even though if the issue 
had been decided in his favor in the prior action, he would not have been entitled to 
assert the prior adjudication in a subsequent action against a stranger to the judgment. 
The central question in determining whether the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel apply is whether the party against whom the plea is raised has had 
a full opportunity to litigate the issue in question. 
Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 582–83 (citations omitted). 
 212. See Toporek v. Zepp, 479 S.E.2d 759, 760 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (acknowledging that “in Watts 
we held that the privity requirement of collateral estoppel is confined to the party against whom the plea 
is asserted” but noting that “[t]his Court is bound by [Georgia Supreme Court holdings]” (citations 
omitted)); Miller v. Steelmaster Material Handling Corp., 478 S.E.2d 601, 603–04 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) 
(declining to allow nonmutual preclusion and instead engaging in a privity analysis); Stiltjes v. Ridco 
Exterminating Co., 399 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1990) (same). 
 213. 489 S.E.2d 153, 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, No. S97C1859, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 185 
(Ga. Jan. 5, 1998). 
 214. Id. (“The underlying question[,] upon which this case turns, is whether the mutual identity of the 
parties is required for collateral estoppel.”). 
 215. See id. at 155–56. “The current rule allows parties to relitigate issues they have already litigated 
and lost, straining judicial resources and creating the possibility of inconsistent results.” Id. at 156. 
 216. Id. at 155–56 (first quoting Ervin, 430 S.E.2d at 134; then citing Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 582–83; 
then citing Winters, 346 S.E.2d at 127; then citing Wilson, 402 S.E.2d at 293; and then citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (AM. L. INST. 1982)). 
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privies—even though, as discussed supra, “the Supreme Court cases 
did not in fact turn on the identity of parties element.”217 In doing so, 
Wickliffe explicitly overruled the line of cases applying nonmutual 
preclusion.218 The Georgia Court of Appeals continued, however, to 
directly ask the Georgia Supreme Court “to embrace the modern 
trend when it does directly address this issue.”219 Despite this 
unanimous opinion by the lower court, the Georgia Supreme Court 
denied certiorari.220 More than a decade later, the court has yet to 
“directly address this issue.”221 
A few years after Wickliffe, one lower court attempted to 
distinguish the precedent by redefining and expanding the meaning 
of “party” in the context of the “identity of parties” element.222 In 
Edmondson v. Gilmore, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a 
litigant who was “not technically” a party to the first action may 
nevertheless preclude an issue decided in the first case because the 
 
 217. Id. at 156 (“[W]e are constrained to follow the Supreme Court and require that collateral 
estoppel requires identity of parties.”); see also discussion supra Section II.C. 
 218. Id. (“Our decision necessitates that we overrule Ervin, [430 S.E.2d 133]; Watts, [320 S.E.2d 
581]; Winters, [346 S.E.2d 124]; and Wilson, [402 S.E.2d 291].”). The court uses the term “overrule.” 
Id. Although an appellate court generally cannot overrule itself, nine judges concurred in the Wickliffe 
decision, and no judges dissented. Id. at 157. Under Georgia Court of Appeals rules, “[p]rior decisions 
of the Court may be overruled by a single division of the Court after consultation with the other 
nondisqualified judges on the Court, provided the decision of the division is unanimous.” GA. CT. APP. 
R. 33(a); see also Austin Martin Williams, Researching Georgia Law (2015 Edition), 31 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 741, 746–47 (2015) (“A judgment concurred in by all the judges in a division will be binding on 
all other divisions. However, when the Court of Appeals sits as two divisions and a seventh judge, that 
court can overrule by majority concurrence a previous decision of one division. Moreover, a majority 
concurrence by the entire court will take precedent over any decision by a single division.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 219. Wickliffe I, 489 S.E.2d at 156. The court commented: 
We encourage the Supreme Court to embrace the modern trend when it does directly 
address this issue. The current rule allows parties to relitigate issues they have already 
litigated and lost, straining judicial resources and creating the possibility of 
inconsistent results. Moreover, the Supreme Court has cited sections of the Second 
Restatement of Judgments dealing with collateral estoppel approvingly, . . . and the 
Second Restatement does not require mutuality before parties may be precluded from 
relitigating an issue they have already litigated and lost. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 220. Wickliffe II, No. S97C1859, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 185, at *185 (Jan. 5, 1998) (“The Supreme Court 
today denied the petition for certiorari in this case.”). 
 221. Wickliffe I, 489 S.E.2d at 156; see also discussion supra Section II.C. 
 222. See Edmondson v. Gilmore, 554 S.E.2d 742, 745 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001), vacated, 583 S.E.2d 172 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2003). 
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litigant had an opportunity to intervene in the earlier suit and had an 
interest in the outcome of the case.223 The Georgia Supreme Court 
reversed and again unquestioningly upheld Georgia’s mutuality 
doctrine.224 The state supreme court reasoned that the two cases did 
not meet the identity of parties element due to lack of privity; the 
party asserting issue preclusion did not share the same legal right as 
the party in the previous case.225 
2. Georgia Trial Courts 
The mutuality requirement also continues to befuddle some of 
Georgia’s trial courts. In 2014, one state court mistakenly held that 
“[t]he fact that the former and instant actions involve different 
plaintiffs does not bar application of issue preclusion in this case.”226 
After the losing party pointed out the error, the court had to release a 
new opinion reversing its ruling and applying mutuality.227 In her 
revised order, the trial judge commented that the state’s current strict 
mutuality rule “strains judicial resources” and “creates the possibility 
of inconsistent results” but that she was nevertheless bound by 
Georgia Supreme Court precedent.228 
 
 223. Id. (“We ascertain whether a person is a party ‘exclusively by inspection of the record.’ In so 
doing, we look for the existence of an adversarial relationship.” (footnotes omitted)). Additionally, the 
court said that “[t]he term ‘party’ to an action includes all who are directly interested in the subject 
matter, and who have a right to make defense, control the pleadings, examine and cross-examine 
witnesses, and appeal from the judgment.” Id. (quoting State Bar of Ga. v. Beazley, 350 S.E.2d 422, 425 
(Ga. 1986)). 
 224. In re T.M.G., 570 S.E.2d 327, 329 (Ga. 2002) (“The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that 
the [two lawsuits] involved identical parties or their privies.”). This case involved a sensitive child 
custody matter, and the court’s reversal may have been partially motivated by the emotional factors. See 
id. at 328. Indeed, the Court of Appeals opinion noted the “irony of resolving so emotional a dispute on 
such a technical basis” and “the pain this decision will bring to the [losing party’s] family.” Edmondson, 
554 S.E.2d at 746. 
 225. See In re T.M.G., 570 S.E.2d at 329–330. 
 226. Sadek v. Chowdhury (Sadek I), No. 13-C-07596-S5, 2014 WL 8764962, at *1 (Ga. State Ct. 
Dec. 4, 2014) (citation omitted), vacated, No. 13-C-07596-S5, 2015 WL 1973284 (Ga. State Ct. Jan. 12, 
2015). 
 227. Sadek v. Chowdhury (Sadek II), No. 13-C-07596-S5, 2015 WL 1973284, at *1 (Ga. State Ct. 
Jan. 12, 2015). 
 228. Id. 
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Other Georgia trial courts have similarly recognized the policy 
arguments favoring nonmutuality.229 In one case, the judge noted 
how “[j]udicial resources would indeed be conserved by not 
re-litigating this issue which has obviously been vigorously litigated 
and carefully considered by [the previous judge in the prior case].”230 
Although binding precedent forced the judge to apply mutuality, the 
judge strongly encouraged the defendant to appeal the decision and 
attempt to change the law, even telling the losing defendant that “the 
Court is inclined to grant a certificate of immediate review of this 
decision if requested.”231 The defendant, however, did not file an 
appeal, and the lack of subsequent appellate history suggests that the 
parties may have instead settled the case.232 
E. Missed Opportunities by Georgia Litigants 
Given established Georgia law, many litigants have failed to assert 
an issue preclusion defense and preserve it for appeal. Yet, many 
cases would have been excellent vehicles for advocating for a change 
in this Georgia common law rule.233 Examining certain additional 
Georgia Supreme Court cases will illustrate the missed opportunities 
for Georgia litigants and practitioners—cases where counsel for one 
party could have attempted to argue for a change in Georgia 
preclusion law. 
Miller v. Clayton County presented an opportunity for the 
plaintiffs’ counsel to argue for nonmutual offensive issue 
 
 229. See, e.g., Interfinancial Midtown Inc. v. Troutman Sanders, LLP, No. 2005CV102995, 2006 WL 
4660190 (Ga. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2006). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. (“Despite all the valid reasons for granting [d]efendants’ motion, under the currently existing 
Georgia law of collateral estoppel, the Court finds the motion must be [denied]. The facts of the instant 
case might present an opportunity for the appellate courts to re-examine the law of collateral estoppel in 
Georgia. With that in mind, and with the knowledge that undoubtedly much time and expense will be 
invested in preparing to prosecute and defend [p]laintiff’s [c]ount II in the instant litigation, the Court is 
inclined to grant a certificate of immediate review of this decision if requested.”). 
 232. See id. 
 233. See generally Coen v. CDC Software Corp., 816 S.E.2d 670 (Ga. 2018); Miller v. Clayton Cnty., 
518 S.E.2d 402 (Ga. 1999). 
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preclusion.234 The dispute centered on whether the plaintiffs, who 
were court reporters for Clayton County, qualified for certain 
additional retirement benefits under the county’s compensation 
plan.235 A separate court reporter-plaintiff had won a lawsuit against 
the same defendant on the exact same issue a few years prior and 
received the additional benefits.236 
The plaintiffs’ briefs to the court in Miller repeatedly mentioned 
this earlier case and argued that the issue had already been analyzed 
and decided.237 The briefs laid a foundation for an issue preclusion 
argument but never actually mentioned the possibility of issue 
preclusion or cited any related case law or other authority.238 The 
appellees’ reply brief recognized the potential issue preclusion 
problem and even commented that the earlier case “admittedly 
raise[d] similar issues,” but then it correctly noted the inapplicability 
of issue preclusion under current Georgia law due to lack of 
mutuality.239 Per the facts as stated in the briefs, the case would likely 
 
 234. See generally Supplementary Brief of Appellants, Miller, 518 S.E.2d 402 (No. S99A0297), 1999 
WL 33737053. 
 235. See Miller, 518 S.E.2d at 135–36. 
 236. Brief of Appellants at 12, Miller, 518 S.E.2d 402 (No. S99A0297), 1998 WL 34187903, at *12 
(“In an identical case involving the Clayton County Pension Board (a party to this action), by a Clayton 
County court reporter (identical to the appellants here), the lower court ruled [in favor of the court 
reporter].”); see also Supplementary Brief of Appellants, supra note 234, at 2 (“[W]hen the facts are 
clear, the undisputed fact, as found by Judge Simmons in the companion case, is that 
[plaintiff-appellants] are, indeed, full-time . . . employees and are entitled to all of the benefits . . . .”). 
 237. Brief of Appellants, supra note 236, at 12 (“In the [earlier] case, no appeal was ever prosecuted 
by the county, and it remains the law of that case and serves as authority for this Court to correct the 
trial court here so that [appellants] will also be in the same classification as [the plaintiff in the earlier 
case] . . . .”); Supplementary Brief of Appellants, supra note 234, at 1–7. The supplemental brief 
essentially begs the court to defer to the prior decision on the issue because the judge in that case 
“took . . . into account” all of the same facts and evidence, “addressed it all,” and determined that the 
plaintiff in that case “was a covered county employee under the Plan.” Supplementary Brief of 
Appellants, supra note 234, at 6. 
 238. Brief of Appellants, supra note 236, at 15 (“This question was squarely before Judge Simmons 
when he ruled in the [first] case, and his Order, both the original and on the Motion for Reconsideration, 
eloquently display[ed] the sound reasoning for this additional compensation . . . .”); Supplementary 
Brief of Appellants, supra note 234, at 1–7. 
 239. Brief of Appellees at 14–16, Miller, 518 S.E.2d 402 (No. S99A0297), 1999 WL 33737050, at 
*14–16. The appellees’ brief noted that the appellant “relie[d] almost exclusively” on the earlier case 
and that the earlier case “admittedly raise[d] similar issues to those in the case at bar.” Id. at 14. The 
appellees then argued that the prior case “does not bind this Court in any regard, nor did it bind the trial 
court.” Id. In addition to similarly dismissing potential claim preclusion arguments, the appellees noted 
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have met all of the Parklane fairness factors for the application of 
nonmutual offensive preclusion.240 The plaintiffs’ attorneys could 
have urged the court to adopt the federal mutuality doctrine.241 The 
plaintiff-appellants instead lost the case.242 
The litigants in Coen v. CDC Software Corp. also had a chance to 
argue for a change in preclusion law.243 However, the briefs from 
both the appellant and the appellee instead argued whether or not 
privity existed between the parties in the first and second lawsuits.244 
The court’s opinion centered on a lengthy analysis of the “same 
causes of action” element of res judicata.245 Based on the underlying 
facts, the appellee may have been able to prevail on an issue 
preclusion argument if he had argued for a change in the law.246 
Other litigants similarly tried, with some success, to expand the 
definition of privity to comply with the mutuality requirement.247 
III. PROPOSAL 
Georgia should consider following the national trend and allow 
nonmutual defensive applications of issue preclusion. Georgia can 
 
that “[t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel . . . applies only to issues that were actually decided in a 
previous suit, featuring the same parties.” Id. at 15 (citation omitted). Here, the appellees continued, 
“[T]he parties to the case at bar are different from those in [the prior case;] the [prior case] cannot 
preclude this Court’s review of any issues presented in the case at bar.” Id. at 16. 
 240. Supplementary Brief of Appellants, supra note 234, at 1–7; see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331–33 (1979). If this case had been decided under federal law and had plaintiffs’ 
counsel asserted issue preclusion, the plaintiffs likely would have prevailed. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 
331–33. 
 241. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331–33. 
 242. Miller, 518 S.E.2d at 402 (“Because we find no error in the trial court’s determination that for 
the purpose of these additional sums appellants are not employees under the County’s pension 
ordinance, we affirm.”). 
 243. 816 S.E.2d 670 (Ga. 2018). 
 244. Brief of Appellant Timothy F. Coen at 16–17, Coen, 816 S.E.2d 670 (No. S17G1375), 2017 WL 
4221659, at *16–17. (“Here, there was no identity of the parties in the [c]ontract [c]ase and [t]ort [c]ase 
because the individual defendants named in the later [t]ort [c]ase were not in privity . . . .”); see also 
Brief of Appellees at 28–30, Coen, 816 S.E.2d 670 (No. S17G1375), 2017 WL 10128220, at *28–30. 
 245. See Coen, 816 S.E.2d at 673–76. 
 246. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331–33. 
 247. See generally, e.g., Appellee’s Brief in Response to the Brief of Appellants, Lilly v. Heard, 761 
S.E.2d 46 (Ga. 2014) (No. S14A0433), 2013 WL 7018442. 
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recognize nonmutual defensive preclusion without necessarily 
allowing the offensive assertion of issue preclusion.248 The latter 
doctrine remains controversial and could lead to additional litigation 
and confusion among lower state courts.249 In contrast, policy 
justifications strongly support nonmutual defensive issue 
preclusion.250 The traditional policy arguments have heightened 
salience in Georgia in light of recent economic incentives aimed at 
attracting new business to the state; this proposed reform is consistent 
with those goals.251 
The need for change is particularly important for litigators and the 
state judiciary. In addition to alleviating crowded dockets and 
promoting judicial efficiency, broadening the scope of issue 
preclusion would lead to greater clarity and predictability in the law. 
Continued adherence to strict mutuality in Georgia has led to 
ever-expanding definitions of privity as courts in some cases 
recognize the absurdity of relitigating identical issues but remain 
bound to follow elements of issue preclusion as repeated by the 
Georgia Supreme Court.252 These situations can also lead courts to 
grapple with challenging constitutional due process issues that could 
be avoided by the adoption of a common law doctrine emphatically 
endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court and enshrined in federal court 
jurisprudence.253 Conformity with the national consensus would also 
facilitate the duties of federal judges sitting in diversity, who are 
bound to follow state preclusion law, as well as out-of-state 
practitioners, who may not be familiar with the current particularities 
 
 248. See Schopler, supra note 17, § 4(c) (“[C]ourts are more inclined to permit the defensive, than the 
offensive, use of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.”). 
 249. See discussion supra Section I.A.1. 
 250. See supra Section II.A. 
 251. See Matt Weeks, Georgia Economy Still Riding Expansion Wave into 2019, UGA TODAY (Dec. 
6, 2018), https://news.uga.edu/economic-outlook-2019/ [https://perma.cc/3DT8-D8J9]; Pro-Business 
Environment, supra note 22. 
 252. See supra Section II.B. 
 253. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 705 (2011) (recognizing that courts generally prefer 
avoiding constitutional issues if possible). The Court commented: “a ‘longstanding principle of judicial 
restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of 
deciding them.’” Id. (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 
(1988)). 
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of Georgia law.254 Similarly, implementing consistent mutuality 
doctrines across jurisdictions would benefit multijurisdictional 
litigators by allowing for greater predictability of future judgments. 
The most natural solution for reforming Georgia mutuality law lies 
with convincing the Georgia Supreme Court to (1) take up the issue 
and assess its merits, and (2) change the elements of common law 
issue preclusion to allow nonmutual defensive assertion. Practitioners 
advocating for this judicial change in the law must remain cognizant 
of both the procedural hurdles and the policy arguments for reform. 
As an alternative solution, the state legislature may enact this 
proposed reform via statute by codifying nonmutual defensive issue 
preclusion as part of the state’s Civil Practice Act. 
A. Georgia-Specific Policy Considerations 
Georgia’s rapid population growth and increasingly crowded court 
dockets amplify the policy advantages of allowing nonmutual 
defensive issue preclusion.255 Broadening the preclusion rule also 
fosters economic growth by reducing the costs of duplicative 
litigation.256 Additionally, Georgia’s current doctrine—at odds with 
the vast majority of other states and jurisdictions—reduces 
predictability and creates unnecessary confusion for practitioners and 
judges.257 
1. Judicial Efficiency 
Georgia courts increasingly face the problems of crowded civil 
dockets and lengthy delays in trial and hearing calendars, especially 
 
 254. See supra Section I.A.2; see also Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 
508–09 (2001). 
 255. Michael E. Kanell, Georgia Population Grew by 110,973 in a Year—7th Largest in the U.S., 
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/business/georgia-population-grew-110-973-
year-7th-largest/t4BpHTNVAwPoc08Xr60ajJ/ [https://perma.cc/9SXF-2AXA] (“Americans are 
increasingly on the move and a lot of them are coming to Georgia.”). 
 256. MOORE ET AL., supra note 7, § 132.01 ¶ 3. 
 257. See Erichson, supra note 8, at 966. 
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in light of recent reductions to court budgets.258 Crowded dockets and 
litigation delays result in overworked judges, stymied access to 
justice, and increased costs to both plaintiffs and defendants.259 
Georgia’s ongoing population growth will likely perpetuate these 
problems in the coming years.260 
Nonmutual defensive issue preclusion provides for quick 
adjudication of cases when case-dispositive issues, such as 
negligence or liability, have been previously litigated and decided.261 
Even when an already-decided issue is not case-dispositive, its 
preclusion allows the court to preserve valuable time and resources 
that would have been spent hearing arguments on duplicative 
motions, briefs, or presentations of facts at trial.262 This increased 
efficiency also promotes the right to speedy trials and increases 
access to justice by allowing other pending cases to move to trial 
more quickly.263 
 
 258. W. Anthony Jenkins, Judicial Crossroads: The Journey Toward Judicial Reform, MICH. BAR J., 
Mar. 2011, at 14, 15 (recognizing that Georgia faces “devastating budget cuts to its state court system”). 
The recent COVID-19 pandemic—ongoing at the time of this Note’s publication—will likely amplify 
these problems, especially as courts begin tackling the growing backlog of cases. See Lindsey B. Mann 
& Alison A. Grounds, Response to COVID-19: Litigation Impacts and Resources in Georgia, 
TROUTMAN PEPPER: ARTICLES & PUBL’NS (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.troutman.com/insights/response-
to-covid-19-litigation-impacts-and-resources-in-georgia.html [https://perma.cc/5HAV-6FP3]. 
 259. FULTON CNTY. SUPER. CT., BUSINESS COURT: 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2014), 
https://www.fultoncourt.org/business/Business_Court_2014_Annual_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NV93-STU5] (“Court delays not only increase costs for all litigants, but can negatively 
impact Georgia’s economy.” (citing THE WASH. ECON. GRP., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS ON THE 
GEORGIA ECONOMY OF DELAYS IN GEORGIA’S STATE COURTS DUE TO RECENT REDUCTIONS IN 
FUNDING FOR THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2011))). Of course, issue preclusion reform alone cannot cure 
these larger problems, but judges and litigants would surely appreciate any potentially increased 
expeditiousness in resolving their disputes. 
 260. Kanell, supra note 255. 
 261. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464. This adjudication often occurs via summary 
judgment motion. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. See Maryland ex rel. Gliedman v. Cap. Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298, 304 (D. Md. 1967). In 
reaching its finding allowing nonmutual preclusion, the court explained its rationale: 
[T]he court has taken into account not only the right of society to have its courts 
render justice as inexpensively as possible and the right of each litigant to have his 
day in court, but also the rights of other litigants who might have to wait to have their 
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2. Economic Growth and Industry Protectionism 
Georgia policy makers repeatedly state their intentions of 
improving the state’s economy by attracting new industry, reducing 
regulations, and promoting growth.264 Economists have found that 
efficiency-focused court reform efforts positively affect economic 
growth and business development.265 In contrast, delays in the 
judicial system can lead to lower wages, lower revenue, and stymied 
economic output.266 
Nonmutual defensive issue preclusion would protect Georgia 
industry and business interests without any significant adverse impact 
on the rights of injured plaintiffs.267 Small businesses, corporations, 
and other employers are more likely to be defendants in civil suits.268 
Allowing these defendants to assert issue preclusion when the 
plaintiff’s grievance has already been adjudicated would reduce their 
litigation costs.269 Companies may presumably then choose to 
 
 264. Pro-Business Environment, supra note 22. 
 265. See Jenkins, supra note 258, at 15. The findings of the State Bar of Georgia study included that 
“[t]he court system in Georgia is a key economic development foundation of the state . . . [and] efficient 
dispositions . . . [of lawsuits] impact Georgia’s business and social climates.” Id. 
 266. Id. (“Court delays due to lack of proper funding represent a ‘dead weight’ cost to the economy in 
terms of lost economic output, labor income, and fiscal revenues. Those delays also adversely impact 
other nonquantifiable measures of socioeconomic well being.”). The State Bar study also concluded that 
“the economic impact of judicial underfunding in Georgia is between $337 million and $802 million.” 
Id. 
 267. See supra Part II. For a counterargument, see Note, Exposing the Extortion Gap: An Economic 
Analysis of the Rules of Collateral Estoppel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1940 (1992) (arguing that either a 
return to mutuality or, alternatively, allowing assertions of issue preclusion against a nonparty to the 
prior suit would yield the most economically efficient dispositions). 
 268. See supra Part II. 
 269. Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971) (“To the extent 
the defendant in the second suit may not win by asserting [issue preclusion],  . . . the defendant’s time 
and money are diverted from alternative uses—productive or otherwise—to relitigation of a decided 
issue.”). The United States has the highest costs of litigation per capita in the developed world; 
disavowing the antiquated mutuality standard would reduce those costs in Georgia. U.S. Legal System Is 
World’s Most Costly According to a New Study, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (May 14, 
2013), https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/us-legal-system-is-worlds-most-costly-
according-to-a-new-study [https://perma.cc/EF3R-PYM4] (“Data shows that, as a percentage of its 
economy, the U.S. legal system costs over 150 percent more than the Eurozone average, and over 50 
percent more than the United Kingdom.”). 
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allocate their resources towards more productive ends such as 
increased hiring or greater innovation.270 
3. Predictability and Cross-Jurisdictional Consistency
Scholars generally agree that predictability “is a defining feature of 
the rule of law.”271 Businesses also value predictability in the law 
because it serves to reduce compliance costs and ensure accurate 
financial planning, among other reasons.272 Attorneys and advisors 
need clear and predictable procedural rules to effectively counsel 
clients and make appropriate strategic litigation decisions.273 Strict 
mutuality undermines the rule of law because it can result in 
inconsistent verdicts on the same exact issue when the issue is 
subject to repeated litigation in various forums or by different 
attorneys.274 These inconsistent verdicts severely impact the ability of 
attorneys to properly advise clients and the ability of businesses to 
predict litigation outcomes and make financial decisions 
accordingly.275 
270. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 328 (“To the extent the defendant in the second suit may not win 
by asserting [issue preclusion], . . . the defendant’s time and money are diverted from alternative uses—
productive or otherwise—to relitigation of a decided issue.”). 
271. Kem Thompson Frost, Predictability in the Law, Prized Yet Not Promoted: A Study in Judicial 
Priorities, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 48, 51 (2015). “Achieving predictability of outcomes within a 
jurisdiction and uniformity in the law across parallel jurisdictions helps assure consistency in judicial 
decisions, giving people a greater sense of certainty in the way courts will resolve disputes.” Id.; see 
also, e.g., Marcin Matczak, Why Judicial Formalism Is Incompatible with the Rule of Law, 31 CAN. J.L. 
& JURIS. 61, 63 (2018) (noting that “one of the main tenets of the rule of law [is] the predictability of 
court verdicts”). 
272. Byassesse, supra note 104, at 1426 (“[P]reclusion promotes public confidence in the legal 
system and permits interested parties to predict and plan future affairs based on the results obtained in a 
prior lawsuit. Knowing that subsequent litigation will not supersede these results, litigants may depend 
upon the rights and liabilities established previously in planning their future financial needs or business 
decisions.” (footnotes omitted)). See generally Howard H. Stevenson & Milhnea C. Moldoveanu, The 
Power of Predictability, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 1995, at 140, https://hbr.org/1995/07/the-power-
of-predictability [https://perma.cc/49JM-S6HZ]. 
273. Erichson, supra note 8, at 1013–14 (“Particularly in areas in which predictability matters, such as 
when litigators must make strategic decisions based on the anticipated effect of a judgment, we should 
prefer a simple rule to a more intricate or indeterminate one.”). 
274. See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text (discussing the “gaming table” concerns with 
the mutuality requirement). 
275. See Erichson, supra note 8, at 1013–14.
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Georgia’s continued adherence to a minority rule—at most, only 
six other states follow a similar strict mutuality doctrine—also 
lessens predictability of litigation outcomes on a more macro level by 
causing confusion and often unnecessary appeals, especially in 
multijurisdictional litigation.276 When the first suit and the second 
suit were brought in separate jurisdictions, Georgia’s incongruous 
doctrine forces courts to grapple with complex conflict of law and 
choice of law problems.277 The increase in class actions, mass torts, 
and other multiforum litigation highlights the need for Georgia to 
change its law and conform with near-universally accepted mutuality 
rules.278 As one scholar aptly described it, “Excessive procedural 
debate only tends to make courts burdened, lawyers rich, and 
everybody else confused.”279 
Indeed, lawyers and even judges have confused choice of law 
doctrines and incorrectly applied the wrong jurisdiction’s issue 
preclusion law.280 In most cases, citing another state’s law (or federal 
law) regarding mutuality essentially amounts to a harmless error 
because most states allow nonmutual issue preclusion with similar 
requirements.281 When Georgia litigants mistakenly proceed under 
that assumption, however, the misunderstanding can have severe 
consequences and result in unpredictable judgments.282 
 
 276. Id. at 966 (“A number of states cling to the traditional mutuality requirement. Alabama, Florida, 
Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Virginia require mutuality.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 277. Id at 1016. 
 278. Id. at 1015 (“The need for a clear, reliable rule of interjurisdictional preclusion has grown with 
the phenomenal growth of multiparty, multiforum litigation. The unpredictability of choice of preclusion 
law and the tendency of many courts unthinkingly to apply their own preclusion law to other courts’ 
judgments highlight the need for a clear rule.”). 
 279. Id. at 1013. 
 280. Id. at 1015 (“[M]any courts unthinkingly [] apply their own preclusion law to other courts’ 
judgments”). See generally QOS Networks Ltd. v. Warburg Pincus & Co., No. 02-1-5305-34, 2006 WL 
4513580 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2006) (applying Georgia issue preclusion law without discussion of 
choice of law doctrines when the first lawsuit was adjudicated by a New York court). 
 281. See, e.g., Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1272 n.20 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that 
prior cases “did not reach the question of which law to apply, because both Georgia and federal law 
required ‘the actual litigation of the issue in question in the prior proceeding,’ which was dispositive of 
the issue” (quoting Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 142 F.3d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1998))). “Of 
course, it would make no difference in this case, because there is identity of parties.” Id. 
 282. See generally Memorandum in Support of General Mills Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss the 
Complaint, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Mills, Inc. (CSX Transp. I), No. 1:14-CV-00201-TWT, 2015 WL 
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This concern is not hypothetical. In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. 
General Mills, Inc., a case ultimately decided on appeal to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 2017, the legal team for 
General Mills—experienced attorneys from a large Minnesota firm 
with the assistance of local counsel—filed a lengthy motion to 
dismiss, asserting an issue preclusion defense.283 As it turns out, CSX 
Transportation (the plaintiff) had already litigated the same alleged 
negligence in an earlier proceeding against another party, and a jury 
unambiguously resolved the issue by finding that CSX’s “sole 
negligence” caused the disputed accident and resulting injuries.284 
The otherwise well-written brief for General Mills thoroughly 
explained how all of the elements of issue preclusion were met under 
federal law, but the brief did not mention Georgia procedural law.285 
Presumably, based on their cited law, corporate counsel advised their 
client that they had a high likelihood of success on their motion to 
dismiss. In fact, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Georgia trial judge agreed with them and granted the motion to 
dismiss.286 
On appeal, however, CSX correctly argued that, although the first 
lawsuit was decided in federal court, Georgia preclusion law applied 
because the court sat in diversity.287 As a nonparty to the first suit, 
 
468682 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 3, 2015), 2014 WL 11191996. 
 283. Id. at 12–14. 
 284. Id. at 14–15. 
 285. Id. at 12–18. 
 286. CSX Transp. I, 2015 WL 468682, at *5; see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Mills, Inc. (CSX 
Transp. II), No. 1:14-CV-201-TWT, 2015 WL 12856027, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 13, 2015) (denying 
CSX’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s order granting General Mills’ motion to dismiss, but 
granting CSX’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint), rev’d and remanded, 846 F.3d 1333 
(11th Cir. 2017). In sum, the relevant initial procedural history of the case was as follows: 
The Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, or alternatively, Motion for 
Leave to File an Amended Complaint. It argued that this Court incorrectly applied 
federal collateral estoppel law, and not Georgia collateral estoppel law. The Court 
initially denied the Motion for Reconsideration, but granted the Motion for Leave to 
File an Amended Complaint, allowing the Plaintiff to file an amended complaint 
putting in issue the collateral estoppel question. However, on reconsideration, the 
Court later denied the Motion to Amend the Complaint. 
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Mills, Inc. (CSX Transp. IV), No. 1:14-CV-201-TWT, 2017 WL 4472787, at 
*1 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2017) (footnotes omitted). 
 287. Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant CSX Transportation, Inc. at 8–11, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gen. 
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General Mills could not satisfy strict mutuality under Georgia law 
and therefore lost the appeal.288 The success of the motion to dismiss 
hinged entirely on the mutuality element.289 In fairness to the losing 
legal team, the governing precedent was not entirely clear at the 
time.290 But that is precisely the point—Georgia clinging to strict 
mutuality leads to avoidable appeals and mistaken assumptions about 
the possible outcome of disputes. 
The CSX Transportation example illustrates how congruent 
procedural rules across jurisdictions would minimize the 
consequences of potentially unclear and complex choice of law 
doctrines.291 Federal issue preclusion law has largely remained 
consistent and relatively predictable for decades.292 Changing 
Georgia law to allow nonmutual defensive issue preclusion provides 
the best and most practical avenue for achieving conformity and 
advancing the policy of predictability in this area. By simply 
adopting the federal common law elements, the Georgia Supreme 
Court would eliminate these burdens on litigants and streamline the 
disposition of issue preclusion defenses.293 
B. How Practitioners Should Proceed 
Practitioners should embrace the opportunity to challenge the 
current status quo in state law by asserting nonmutual application of 
 
Mills, Inc. (CSX Transp. III), 846 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2017) (Nos. 15-12095, 15-14399), 2016 WL 
2347265, at *8–11. 
 288. See generally CSX Transp. III, 846 F.3d 1333. 
 289. Id. at 1340. 
 290. Id. 
 291. See generally id. 
 292. Id.; see also supra Part II. 
 293. Compare WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3 (listing the black letter law elements of issue 
preclusion: (1) both actions involved an identical issue; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided 
in the first action; (3) the parties in the first action had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; (4) 
the first action was adjudicated as a valid final judgment on the merits; and (5) some form of mutuality 
or limited nonmutuality, including nonmutual defensive and conditional nonmutual offensive issue 
preclusion), with Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1264 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A party seeking to 
assert collateral estoppel under Georgia law must demonstrate that (1) an identical issue, (2) between 
identical parties, (3) was actually litigated and (4) necessarily decided, (5) on the merits, (6) in a final 
judgment, (7) by a court of competent jurisdiction.”). 
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issue preclusion in every possible case it could apply. Issue 
preclusion is an affirmative defense that courts generally cannot raise 
sua sponte.294 Therefore, trial counsel must recognize potential 
preclusion defensives and raise them as early as possible.295 
Additionally, to preserve the arguments for appeal, parties should 
argue for changing preclusion law in their briefs at every stage of 
litigation.296 
Thoroughly briefing the mutuality issue should be of paramount 
importance both when petitioning the Georgia Supreme Court for 
certiorari and when submitting briefs to the court after it grants 
certiorari. Unless practitioners force their hand, the justices may try 
to sidestep the mutuality issue and instead decide the case on other 
grounds, such as privity.297 
When an attorney—most likely a defense counsel—has a case ripe 
for applying nonmutual defensive preclusion, the attorney should 
explicitly argue for a change in law (i.e., overruling Waldroup).298 
The briefs to the Georgia Supreme Court should include citations to 
Blonder-Tongue and Parklane, as well as to the leading cases in other 
jurisdictions and the other persuasive authorities mentioned 
 
 294. Haygood v. Head, 699 S.E.2d 588, 592 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he trial court lacked authority 
to rule, sua sponte, on the merits of a collateral estoppel defense . . . . Collateral estoppel is an 
affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved.” (citations omitted)). But see Insituform Techs., 
LLC v. Cosmic TopHat, LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1141 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (“[W]hen the prior decision 
was made by the same court, the court may apply preclusion principles sua sponte.” (citing Shurick v. 
Boeing Co., 623 F.3d 1114, 1116 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010))). 
 295. Haygood, 699 S.E.2d at 592. The Haygood case illustrates the consequences of delay in raising 
an issue preclusion defense: the defendants lost their chance to assert the defense and ultimately lost the 
case. Id. (“As neither Head nor Larry Rogers raised a collateral estoppel defense prior to the time the 
trial court entered its dismissal orders, the trial court should not have considered the defense.”). 
 296. Cf. id. The court of appeals did not consider the merits of issue preclusion because it was not 
properly raised at the trial court. Id. 
 297. The court has often used its ever-expanding definition of privity to allow parties to prevail on 
what should have been a nonmutual issue preclusion defense. See, e.g., Lilly v. Heard, 761 S.E.2d 46, 
50–51 (Ga. 2014) (finding privity between two parties for the purpose of issue preclusion based solely 
on the parties’ “common interest” as “residents and voters” of the same county); Parker v. Parker, 594 
S.E.2d 627, 629 (Ga. 2004). Although zealous advocacy may often require attorneys to argue for privity, 
they should not let a potentially winnable privity argument stop them from also urging the court to 
change the mutuality doctrine. 
 298. Waldroup v. Greene Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 463 S.E.2d 5, 7–8 (Ga. 1995); see also supra Section 
II.C. 
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throughout this Note.299 Briefs to the court should also explain the 
policy justifications300—the economic arguments may carry great 
weight with the justices, especially if coupled with amicus briefs 
from influential groups such as the Georgia Chamber of 
Commerce.301 Notably, Georgia courts have already acknowledged 
the importance of similar policy goals in other cases.302 
The Georgia Supreme Court recognized the modern mutuality 
trends in a footnote and arguably already applied nonmutual 
defensive preclusion in Nally.303 Although the facts in Nally were 
particularly conducive to arguing for a change in the law, the pro se 
plaintiff did not point out the mutuality requirement when defense 
counsel asserted issue preclusion.304 Nevertheless, future 
practitioners with more resources should cite this case and note that 
the court has previously ignored the mutuality requirement to achieve 
its desired ends.305 
Convincing the justices to apply the modern trends as a matter of 
state common law would not necessarily require changing minds but 
rather just explaining the importance of this relatively obscure 
 
 299. See, e.g., supra Sections I.A–B. The Georgia Supreme Court has previously relied on U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent to decide state law civil claims when the federal courts provided helpful 
analysis. See, e.g., Gwinnett Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Comput. Servs., 538 S.E.2d 
746, 748–49 (Ga. 2000). 
 300. See supra Section II.A. 
 301. See Kristal Dixon, Christian Coomer Appointed to Ga. Court of Appeals, PATCH (Sept. 15, 
2018), https://patch.com/georgia/cartersville/christian-coomer-appointed-ga-court-appeals 
[https://perma.cc/3ZAS-7BZV] (noting that one judge “was appointed to the Court Reform Council by 
[Governor Nathan] Deal and was named the Georgia Chamber of Commerce’s Legislator of the Year in 
2017”). 
 302. See, e.g., Stott v. Mody, 572 S.E.2d 83, 86 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming a summary judgment 
of preclusion based on finding of privity). In Stott, the Georgia Court of Appeals held: 
The fact that they lack a remedy . . . does not require this court to disregard 
established legal principles and allow them to relitigate the very issue already 
adjudicated . . . . This would be tantamount to creating “a framework under which a 
plaintiff could consciously design a legal strategy which would allow him two shots 
at the same target.” 
Id. (quoting McNeal v. Paine, Weber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 293 S.E.2d 331, 333 (Ga. 1982)). These 
very same arguments also apply to permitting nonmutual defensive issue preclusion. 
 303. See supra Section II.C; see also Nally v. Bartow Cnty. Grand Jurors, 633 S.E.2d 337, 339–40 
(Ga. 2006). 
 304. See Nally, 633 S.E.2d at 338–39. 
 305. See supra Section II.C. 
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doctrinal reform.306 In a 2020 case, the Georgia Supreme Court 
opined that “[t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel must be applied with 
‘realism and rationality’ and not in a ‘hypertechnical and archaic’ 
manner.”307 Practitioners should cite this sentence and argue that 
strict mutuality is perhaps the most “archaic” and least “rational” 
aspect of Georgia’s current collateral estoppel jurisprudence.308 
Although that case did not ultimately center on civil procedure, the 
court did rely heavily on U.S. Supreme Court decisions, which it 
could (and should) do again when changing issue preclusion law to 
conform with federal standards.309 
In fact, the Georgia Supreme Court has approvingly cited decisions 
of the U.S. Supreme Court when deciding other issue preclusion 
cases.310 In Gwinnett County Board of Tax Assessors v. General 
Electric Capital Computer Services, the Georgia Supreme Court 
ruled on the applicability of issue preclusion in certain tax cases.311 
The court commented that “[t]he Supreme Court of the United States 
has addressed the role of collateral estoppel in a tax dispute,” and 
then devoted the next two paragraphs of its opinion to reviewing the 
relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases and their holdings.312 
The justices have also looked to the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments for guidance when clarifying other elements of issue 
preclusion.313 In Kent v. Kent, the appellant’s resourceful counsel 
pointed out the ambiguities of the “essential to the judgment” 
element of issue preclusion in appellate court precedent.314 In its 
 
 306. See supra Section II.C. 
 307. Medina v. State, 844 S.E.2d 767, 773 (Ga. 2020) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 
(1970)). 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. See, e.g., Gwinnett Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Comput. Servs., 538 S.E.2d 
746, 748 (Ga. 2000). 
 311. Id. at 746–47. 
 312. Id. at 748–49. 
 313. See, e.g., Kent v. Kent, 452 S.E.2d 764, 766 n.2 (Ga. 1995). 
 314. Id. (“The wife argues the second element, that the determination be essential to the judgment, is 
unnecessary. A number of cases from our court and the Court of Appeals state that collateral estoppel 
(or ‘estoppel by judgment’) applies to matters ‘necessarily or actually decided.’ . . . However, the 
question of whether the previously litigated issue was or was not essential to the earlier judgment did 
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analysis, the Georgia Supreme Court cited the Restatement and 
concluded, “[t]he correct rule, followed in some of our appellate 
decisions, . . . is that followed by the Restatement.”315 Of course, this 
same Restatement also endorses nonmutual defensive issue 
preclusion.316 
Importantly, however, persuasive authority from other 
jurisdictions has not always carried the day for the Georgia Supreme 
Court justices.317 In Shields v. Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing 
Corp., the parties did not contest the mutuality element; rather, the 
appellant tried to persuade the court that issue preclusion should not 
apply to unemployment compensation decisions.318 The appellant’s 
brief heavily cited the Restatement, federal court decisions, and 
decisions from more than ten other states’ highest courts.319 All of 
those sources supported the appellant’s public policy arguments.320 
Despite this apparent national consensus, the court ruled against the 
appellant.321 And despite the appellant’s lengthy brief detailing the 
viewpoints of other courts and legal scholars,322 the court’s opinion 
exclusively cited Georgia cases and did not address the public policy 
arguments.323 This deviation from national consensus, however, 
 
not seem to be disputed in those cases.” (citations omitted)). Practitioners should cite this passage and 
point out that most of the litigants in the court’s earlier decisions similarly did not dispute the issue of 
whether mutuality applies. See id. (collecting cases where the issue of mutuality was not in dispute). 
 315. Id. (citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. L. INST. 
1982). 
 316. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (AM. L. INST. 1982) (“A party who has had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate an issue has been accorded the elements of due process. In the absence of 
circumstances suggesting the appropriateness of allowing him to relitigate the issue, there is no good 
reason for refusing to treat the issue as settled so far as he is concerned other than that of making the 
burden of litigation risk and expense symmetrical between him and his adversaries.”); see also 
Hoffheimer, supra note 6, at 544 (“The Restatement (Second) of Judgments largely codifies the Supreme 
Court’s approach in Parklane Hosiery.”). 
 317. See, e.g., Shields v. Bellsouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp., 545 S.E.2d 898, 898–99 (Ga. 2001). 
 318. Brief of Appellant Paul Shields at 3, 16, Shields, 545 S.E.2d 898 (No. 99-8307-HH), 2000 WL 
34252049, at *3, *16. The Appellant argued that unemployment compensation proceedings do not 
provide a claimant a full and fair opportunity to litigate all issues related to his discharge. Id. at 3, 24–
30. 
 319. Id. at 9–28. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Shields, 545 S.E.2d at 898–99. 
 322. See Brief of Appellant Paul Shields, supra note 318, at 9–28. 
 323. Shields, 545 S.E.2d at 900–01. 
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should not necessarily alarm proponents of nonmutual issue 
preclusion because the underlying policy goals implicitly advanced 
by the court’s holding—broadening the scope of issue preclusion—
are consistent with those of nonmutuality.324 Regardless, the primary 
takeaway from the Shields case is that practitioners should not rely 
exclusively on persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, 
regardless of its breadth. Instead, appellate briefs should also include 
citations to prior Georgia case law such as Wickliffe and the line of 
appellate cases that began to abrogate mutuality before being 
overturned.325 
C. The Legislative Alternative 
Should the Georgia Supreme Court continue to resist changing the 
traditional mutuality doctrine, the Georgia General Assembly can 
codify nonmutual defensive preclusion in a statute. Indeed, some 
courts have relied on existing statutory authority when applying other 
elements of preclusion law.326 The legislature could either amend that 
statute or enact a new one. 
The legislature already expressed its preference for conformity 
with federal law in this area when it modeled the Georgia Civil 
Practice Act after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.327 In fact, the 
legislature continues to update Georgia civil procedure statutes to 
 
 324. See generally id. (applying issue preclusion to unemployment compensation decisions). The 
Shields rule broadens the scope of issue preclusion, and nonmutuality similarly increases the categories 
of litigants allowed to assert an issue preclusion defense. Id. 
 325. See, e.g., Wickliffe I, 489 S.E.2d 153, 155–56 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, No. S97C1859, 
1998 Ga. LEXIS 185 (Ga. Jan. 5, 1998). 
 326. See, e.g., Morrison v. Morrison, 663 S.E.2d 714, 719 (Ga. 2008) (Benham, J., dissenting) 
(finding that Georgia Code section 9-12-40 “codifies the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel”); O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 (2015 & Supp. 2020) (“A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction 
shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which 
under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered 
until the judgment is reversed or set aside.”). 
 327. See, e.g., Ashley Harris et al., Civil Practice Act: Allow for Discretionary Appeal of Class 
Certification; Adopt Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 Pertaining to Class Actions; Amend Interest 
Amount on Judgments; Prohibit Third Voluntary Dismissal by Plaintiff; Permit Courts to Use 
Discretion in Declining Jurisdiction When Another Forum Is More Convenient; Change the 
Pre-Judgment Interest Rate; Provide for Vacation of an Arbitration Award Based Upon an Arbitrator’s 
Manifest Disregard for the Law, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 28, 36 (2003). 
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match the federal standards.328 These changes greatly simplify state 
court litigation for attorneys already familiar with the federal rules, 
which all law school students learn as part of the mandatory first-year 
curriculum. Although nonmutual issue preclusion is not codified in 
the federal rules, nothing prevents Georgia from amending the Civil 
Practice Act to further mirror established federal jurisprudence. 
The Georgia legislature has not been shy in superseding common 
law.329 The legislators passed a tort reform measure in 2005 and may 
take up the issue again in future sessions.330 Although perhaps less 
politically salient, issue preclusion reform—specifically, allowing 
nonmutual defensive preclusion—serves many of the same ends as 
tort reform with much less controversy or potential inequity.331 
CONCLUSION 
Simply stated, when it comes to plaintiffs litigating an issue, the 
standard should be “one bite, everybody knows the rules.”332 
Georgia’s current precedent allows plaintiffs to have multiple “bites,” 
and no one seems to know the rules.333 
 
 328. See id. 
 329. Dave Williams, Georgia Republicans Likely to Renew Push for Tort Reform, ATLANTA BUS. 
CHRON. (Sept. 6, 2019, 5:45 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2019/09/06/georgia-
republicans-likely-to-renew-push-fortort.html [https://perma.cc/W6GE-5SRK]. 
 330. Rachel Tobin Ramos, Tort Reform Bill Passes General Assembly, Heads to Perdue, ATLANTA 
BUS. CHRON., https://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2005/02/14/daily9.html 
[https://perma.cc/G96A-3BBB] (Feb. 14, 2005, 5:10 PM). The Act capped noneconomic damages for 
medical malpractice claims at $350,000. Id. In 2010, the Georgia Supreme Court found that cap to be 
unconstitutional. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 220 (Ga. 2010); see 
also Nigel Wright et al., Tort Reform Unraveled – Georgia Supreme Court Finds Non-Economic 
Damages Caps to Be Unconstitutional, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 26, 2010), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=caf6cf52-5718-4c29-aa3a-c61518ec73f5 
[https://perma.cc/77DP-M3FB]. Legislators have since “renewed their push for tort reform in a big 
way.” Dave Williams, Tort Reform Push Cranks Up in General Assembly, SAVANNAH NOW (Mar. 1, 
2020, 12:19 PM), https://www.savannahnow.com/news/20200301/tort-reform-push-cranks-up-in-
general-assembly [https://perma.cc/NZK4-ZJPS]. 
 331. Compare sources cited supra note 330, with discussion supra Section II.A 
 332. Cf. Barstool Sports, One Bite with Davey Pageviews – Kiss My Slice with Special Guest Johnny 
Bananas, YOUTUBE (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcENFGaz4VI (using the 
phrase “one bite, everybody knows the rules”). 
 333. See supra Sections I.A.2, I.C, II.D, II.E, III.A.3. 
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In light of the overwhelming national trends and the policy 
considerations discussed throughout this Note, Georgia should 
confront the mutuality issue and allow litigants to assert issue 
preclusion defensively even if they lack mutuality. States began 
rethinking mutuality decades ago, and federal courts continue to 
follow the Blonder-Tongue rule.334 Georgia should not continue to 
lag behind other states in this area of law by following an antiquated 
procedural rule of mutuality. Allowing nonmutual defensive issue 
preclusion would benefit the court system, litigants, and business 
interests. The time is now for the Georgia Supreme Court, or perhaps 





 334. See cases cited supra note 50. 
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